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CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW HELP?
AN ANALYSIS OF THE COLOMBIAN PEACE
PROCESS
Jorge L. Esquirof

"Colombia is the last site of major civil strife in our hemisphere."
President Bill Clinton,
October 28, 1998.
"Colombia's people... should know that we understand the many
dimensions and long-term nature of the problems they face, and that we
will do all we can to help them."
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
August 10, 1999.

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, the guerrilla war in Colombia has dramatically entered the
world stage.
While Colombian governments for decades resisted the
internationalization of the internal conflict, they are now lobbying for U.S. and
European financial support, accepting bi-lateral conditions, and invoking
international norms. This approach offers new possibilities for resolving the forty
year conflict. Upon closer analysis, it could also prolong it.
By internationalization, here, is not meant the mandatory application of the laws
of interstate war nor the recognition of fights to self-determination. It refers to
attempts to manage, and potentially resolve, the internal conflict through international
legal formulas, rather than through simply national or constitutional means.
International legality, in this setting, appears to offer a neutral language in which to
conduct peace talks. Free of the limitations inherent in municipal law, its doctrines
and rules are not settled exclusively by reference to the state. Moreover, the general
policy underlying international law is presumed to promote peace and, at a minimum,
to humanize the war.

* Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. Many thanks to
Northeastern School of Law's Faculty Colloquium and Harvard Law School's European Law Research
Center for their support and to the Leiden Journal of International Law for publication of the
Netherlands version of this work. My deep gratitude to Rodrigo Balen, Marie-Claire Belleau, Nathaniel
Berman, David Kennedy, Diego L6pez Medina, Liliana Obreg6n, Clara Sandoval and Felipe Zuleta for
their wonderful comments and suggestions.
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Internationalization in the sense used here also extends to financial assistance
from the international community. The multiple dimensions of the Colombian conflict
require considerable resources. Securing the needed support is integral to a
comprehensive peace settlement. Bi-lateral or multi-lateral aid and its conditions,
whatever they may be, open the process to international interests. Presumably, any
such conditions would set incentives for peace and not war. As such, an international
law approach coupled with multi-lateral support presents a rather attractive package, at
first blush.
The actual form that internationalization would take and the interests which it
stands to promote, however, are part of a different and more complicated story. In
Colombia, the terrain of international law is dominated by legal experts not so clearly
in favor of a negotiated solution. Colombian publicists routinely invoke international
law to frustrate negotiations and compromise. Their version of law, held to be
singularly authoritative, is actually quite unreflective of contemporary international
practice; dismissive of legal alternatives; and un-conducive to resolving the conflict.
As such, an "internationalization" that advances primarily the use of international law
authority by local actors as the vehicle for peace talks will likely fail. The dominant
conception of law, in this setting, is generally directed against lending legal legitimacy
to political compromise.
Alternatively, an international approach in the hands of the U.S. would not fare
much better. Internationalization in this context quickly reveals that negotiating the
guerrilla war is not the priority. Indeed, the largely bi-partisan support for a hefty
assistance package, now working its way through Congress, is quite telling. Domestic
interests and the political benefits of fighting drugs are at the forefront of U.S.
involvement. As a result, addressing the underlying bases of Colombia's historical
conflict is not paramount. Quite the opposite, the emphasis on a military strategy
against drugs will surely entrench the guerrilla war.
As a result, the projected benefits of internationalization as currently envisaged
are mostly illusory. This is the case since both groups, Colombian publicists and U.S.
policy-makers, who stand in the position of stewards to an international approach
oppose substantial political negotiation. The shift to internationalization, thus, would
merely reinforce the particular interests of these groups, instead of promoting the
purported legality, neutrality and peace associated with internationalism. This is not to
say that an international approach should be abandoned all together. Quite the
contrary, this Article attempts to identify the particular interests, poised to control an
international effort, which undermine a broad-based peace initiative. In their place, a
more successful program would focus on the centrality of Colombia's legacy of
internal war and would offer wide room for legal alternatives, facilitating the
agreements reached by local negotiators.
The bulk of this Article examines the positions of international law taken by
Colombian publicists. I focus on two issues which have been the subject of much
recent debate. The first is the status of Colombia's guerrilla forces. This question
draws on the international law doctrine of belligerency, which purportedly offers
insurgents international standing. The guerrillas lay claim to this formal status. The
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government is opposed for fear of undermining its international position. International
law, as presented by Colombian authorities, is used to caution against governmental
action which would reinforce the guerrillas' claims. Citing elements of belligerency,
international law arguments are marshaled to forestall negotiation and compromise
rather than to facilitate them.
The second issue concerns the rules of conduct of non-international war. The
relevant law is common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Protocol
II of 1977. These provisions establish the formal rules for internal conflicts; at the
same time, they allow parties to the conflict to enter into humanitarian agreements of
their own. Prior to official peace talks, one of Colombia's two main guerrilla groups
agreed, at least in principle, to such an agreement. However, the terms were rejected
by Colombia's international law establishment, if not by the government directly, for
falling below the minimum standards of international humanitarian law. In this
instance, law as presented by Colombian publicists sets the outer boundary to
negotiation and compromise. That boundary, though, is drawn too tightly. As a
result, it functions simply to condemn those on the other side of the negotiating table,
rather than to promote humanitarian conduct.
The last portion of this Article examines the meaning of U.S.-led
internationalization of the Colombian conflict. In this section, I focus on the
preeminence of the drug war over the internal conflict. Here the problem is not one of
excessive rigidity in terms of international law doctrines, as is the case with
Colombian publicists. The contrary is true. Domestic U.S. policy threatens to overrun
the primacy of another nation's sovereign priorities. Turning a peace process among
internal political rivals into a battlefield against drugs transgresses the limits of policy
pragmatism. It advances U.S. concerns, through the leverage of international
assistance, over and above the will of Colombia's people: in contravention of national
plebiscites which overwhelmingly endorse a negotiated solution to the guerrilla war.
Of course, most Colombians themselves are anxious to combat the illegal drug
trade as well. They more than anyone else experience the ravages of its effects. The
drug trade is closely linked to the on-going conflict: war is financed in part through
illegal drug revenues. As such, Colombian officials have not hesitated to accept
counter-narcotics conditions in exchange for assistance with the peace process.
sovereignty concerns, per se, have not been raised. Peace and counter-narcotics,
proponents of aid to Colombia contend, are compatible goals. While that is no doubt
correct, the realities of the U.S. political process have put the accent on the drug war.
Counter-narcotics conditionality may jeopardize the centrality of the peace process.
Putting the drug war ahead of the peace process is at best a questionable strategy: one
that is not likely to lead to results in either case.
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II. BACKGROUND
Political violence and specifically guerrilla war are permanent features of
Colombian history.' The issues and the actors have changed over time, but violence
has remained a consistent and troubling mode of politics.' In its early history, fighting
erupted over questions of political organization, regional power and its institutional
representatives. During the 19th and most of the 20th century, political party
factionalism was a constant source of ethnic-like strife. For the past forty years,
guerrilla violence shaped by Cold War divisions has continued to engulf the nation.
On the left, a well-armed insurgency has grown and continues to advance against the
state. On the right, paramilitaries have since the 1980's emerged as an organized,
armed force. Throughout, drug-related terrorism has not ceased. In the late 1980's, the
drug lords directly challenged the government and lost, still massive drug revenues
continue to fuel the society's generalized violence.
The historical account that follows is a deliberate attempt to highlight the
disjunctures of Colombia's political system.3 Often, representations of Colombia and
its past are limited to accounts of drug-trafficking, violence and human rights abuses.
The political background of this situation is as, if not more, important. Colombia's
history is marked by the efforts of its leaders to resist oppositional groups through the
twin devices of exclusion and co-optation. The current state has been preserved by
repeatedly coopting implacable enemies, offering them a share of state power, while
excluding and repressing less powerful forces. Ironically, this closed system of power
sharing, at times de jure at others de facto, has been able to sustain itself and is
responsible for
the ostensible uninterruptedness of Colombia's long-lasting
democracy. However, the system of exclusion and co-optation has now all but broken
down.

1. See EDUARDO PIZARRO LEONGOMEZ, INSURGENCIA SIN REVOLUCION: LA GUERRILLA EN
COLOMBIA EN UNA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA 114 (1996) [hereinafter PIZARRO]. (Pizarro affirms that
political violence is characteristic of all of Latin America; by contrast, a history of guerrilla violence is
more particular to Colombia.) Translation of all Spanish sources in this article were provided by the
author.
2. See Malcolm Deas, Violent Exchanges: Reflections on Political Violence in Colombia, in THE
LEGITIMIZATION OF VIOLENCE. (David E. Apter ed., 1997). Malcolm Deas notes the complexity of
political violence in Colombia and its unamenability to totalizing explanations. He does note that:
"Prolonged violence has not convinced Colombians that only drastic solutions will work, or that any
authority is better than none." Id. at 389. While rejecting an explanation that Colombia is condemned to
political violence by heritage alone, he does give considerable weight to the particular tradition of
violence as an explanation, which is not so different: "One can begin to isolate the peculiar nature of
Colombian political conflict in the nineteenth century. It seems to have involved more strata of the
local society,... more frequently and repeatedly .... Nor did the conflict ever resolve... the LiberalConservative divide. I shall suggest that this peculiar nature is part of an explanation of the persistently
high level of political violence in Colombia." Id. at 354.
3. The events related in this Article describe the situation in Colombia through the first quarter of
2000. This piece explores primarily the early period of the Colombian peace process. It is an attempt to
memorialize and analyze the arguments and positions of international law affecting this time. In any
case, considering the quickly changing nature of the subject matter, the factual situation described may
have evolved significantly by the time this Article is actually published.
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Efforts aimed at Colombia's troubling situation cannot overlook, and indeed must
specifically target, the unworkability of the current political system. Assistance aimed
at human rights compliance and counter-narcotics operations must take account of the
institutional framework in which these would take place. In this light, the account
below argues for political and institutional reform as fundamental. Only upon the
achievement of some measure of political and societal stability can the problems of
drugs, criminality and violence be effectively addressed.
A. AlternatingPoliticalRepression and Co-optation
Beginning at independence in the 1820's, northern South America emerged
from Spanish colonialism along the lines of the former vice-royalty of New
Granada. The nation was comprised of modem-day Colombia, Ecuador, Panama
and Venezuela Despite regional tensions, a centralized form of government was
adopted. It was only dictatorial rule which toward the end kept the republic intact.'
By the 1830's, Ecuador and Venezuela could no longer be contained and seceded,
seeking greater autonomy.
Struggles over the political system did not end there. Colombia's territory is
marked by strong regional differences, and the nineteenth century is a record of
rural violence and conflict among quasi-sovereign regions. After a period of
experimenting with federalist formulas, the model of partially autonomous states
was discredited as a result of its inability to secure peace and to provide for stable
administration. Further controversy was avoided - roughly - by the Constitution
of 1886 which established a highly centralized political form: the national executive
was to select all governors of departments (smaller territorial units than the regional
extension of former states) who in turn selected all municipal mayors.' Not until the
Constitution of 1991 was this arrangement to change, granting increased powers to
departmental and local authorities.
The twentieth century ushered in civil war between the two political parties
consolidated by that time: the Liberals and the Conservatives. Since the 1886
4.

See generally Malcolm Deas, Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador.- The First Half-Century of

Independence, in 3 THE

CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO C.

1870

(Leslie Bethell ed., 1985).
5. The Congress of Cficuta in 1821 established a rigidly centralized form of government for a
trial period of ten years, in part on the basis of providing for a mutual defense against renewed Spanish
attack. Before 1831, a new constitutional assembly was held due to growing regional dissatisfaction.
Upon the convention's dissolving without any agreement, the Republic's president, Sim6n Bolivar,
assumed dictatorial powers. This quickly hastened the demise of a unified Gran Colombia. See
generallyid.
6. Panama did not become independent from Colombia until 1902. Its independence was gained
through the intervention of U.S. interests in building the Panama Canal. With the support of the U.S.,
the Panamanians declared their independence and immediately proceeded to grant the U.S. the canal
concession. See ROBERT FREEMAN SMITH, Latin America, the United States and the European
Powers, 1830-1930, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, VOL. IV C. 1870 to 1930, 101
(1986).
7.

See DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF ITSELF

143 (1993) [hereinafter BUSHNELL].

CONNECTICUTJOURNAL OF INT'L LA W

[Vol. 16:1

Constitution, Conservatives had a lock grip on the state Liberals sought power by
whatever means they could. A formal war began in late 1899 and officially lasted
1,000 days, therefore the descriptive Thousand Days' War, but on the battlefield the
Liberals were soon crushed. Faced with few options, they turned to a course of
guerrilla action. 9 Increased brutality on all sides did not produce either party's
defeat. Rather, faced with the impending secession of Panama, encouraged by the
U.S., the parties signed a peace treaty aboard a U.S. warship anchored off the coast
of their shores.'
In the 1930's, the Conservative reign was finally disrupted by a Liberal victory
at the polls. Unaccustomed to sharing power, a period of uneasy co-existence
ensued. It ultimately broke down, following the return of Conservatives to elected
power, in mass rioting known as el Bogotazo or 9 de abril in 1948, marking the
beginning of a five year war between Liberals and Conservatives. This period of
Colombian history is recalled as La Violencia. Its end was achieved only as a result
of a military coup in 1953 under the command of General Gustavo Rojas Pinillas,
in power until 1957.
The return to civilian rule came under the form of a revised electoral system.
Under a sort of peace agreement, the country was run by alternating administrations
of Liberals and Conservatives. Under the agreement, the sitting administration
appointed roughly equal numbers from each party to government posts. The
arrangement was known as the National Front, and it formally lasted until 1973.
Since then, Liberals and Conservatives have not taken up arms against each other,
their battles now limited to the political arena. "
During the National Front, a different force emerged: guerrilla groups steeped
in the ideology of the radical left. Numerous reasons have been advanced for their
emergence in Colombia, but salient among them is the political exclusion that the
National Front engendered. While it secured peace between the two main political
camps, it did so at the expense of other politics. The guerrillas identify themselves
as a reaction to this restricted system. Still, scholars continue to debate whether or
not the political system was closed, in fact. 2 Regardless of one's position, the point

8. See id. at 147-48. "Between 1896 and 1904 the Liberals were able to elect only two members
of the Chamber of Representatives; and though their party undoubtedly enjoyed only minority support
in the nation at large, there were many election districts where it could still have won under conditions
of fair competition."
9. See id. at 150.
10. See id. at 152.
11.
The last official National Front president was Misael Pastrana, father to current President
Andrds Pastrana. See BUSHNELL, supra note 7, at 143.
12.

Cf.

DANIEL PECAUT, CRONICA DE Dos DECADAS DE POLiTICA COLOMBIANA 1968-1988

(1989) (rejecting the actual exclusiveness of the political system as an explanation for Colombian
violence); see also, Deas, supra note 2, at 363. Yet Deas notes: "[t]his rhetorical tradition (claiming a
closed political system as the reason for political violence) may well contribute to Colombia's continued
propensity for political violence: it diabolizes, polarizes, and it can be used by both sides of the partisan
divide." Id. at 363.
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remains that the National Front was at a minimum perceived as exclusionary and
incapable of channeling these particular group demands. 3
Possibly even more telling, however, are the insurgent groups' origins. 4
Guerrilla activity commenced predominantly in the same areas plagued by La
Violencia and in many cases by the same people. 5 A re-alignment of factions
occurred. This time the warring camps consisted of the coalition government on
one side and left-wing rebels on the other: in other words, those pacified by the
National Front arrangement on the one side and with those that were not on the
other. The rebels demonstrated some of the very techniques of rural strife of the
party wars and earlier federalism controversies. Their ideology, however, was more
a product of Cold War divisions. Today, much of their political program appears
more in line with progressive democracy than doctrinaire Marxism - although not
in some important respects.
Faced with continuing unrest, in 1991 the Supreme Court of Colombia made
way for a citizen-sponsored constitutional initiative. A popularly-elected assembly
was charged with widening the scope of representative politics and restructuring the
institutions of the state. The constitutional process itself was rather free-wielding
and brought together delegates from a wide sector of society. Represented were
former guerrillas, indigenous peoples, the clergy, Afro-Colombians and a wide
array of political interests. The 1991 Constitution was a response to the widespread
perception of institutionalized exclusion. Notably missing were the country's main
guerrilla groups, still active in the war, who refused to participate in the process.
B. The Current GuerrillaConflict
The guerrillas today consist of two main groups. The largest is the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ej6rcito del Pueblo (more commonly
known as the FARC), which is estimated to consist of approximately 10,000-15,000
full-time combatants 6 scattered throughout Colombia's mountain ranges. The
organization is an outgrowth of the Colombian Communist Party. Under a dual
program of political and violent action, the FARC initially promoted agrarian
13.
Currently, both major guerrilla groups list broader political participation at the top of their
demands. Citing a FARC pronouncement: "The proposal to form a broad political movement, different
in its programmatic objectives and ends is a necessity so that the masses can express their thoughts and
needs by way of a political vehicle other than the bi-partisanism of Liberals and Conservatives."
[Comit6 Internacional de la Cruz Roja, Comisi6n de Conciliaci6n Nacional & Cambio 16] LA PAZ
SOBRE LA MESA 41(1998) [hereinafter LA PAZ].
14. See PIZARRO, supra note 1, at 17-18.
15. See id. at 111. "The historical evidence suggests that the guerrilla experiments undertaken in
the 60's flourished exactly in the same rural areas and in the same populations that had just experienced
the phenomenon known as 'La Violencia.' This evidence cannot be ignored or considered a mere
coincidence." Id.
16. Anti-drug Efforts in Colombia: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relation,
106th Cong. 16 (1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (Testimony of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Under
Secretary for Political Affairs). See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COLOMBIA COUNTRY REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998 (1999) [hereinafter COLOMBIA COUNTRY REPORT] available at
www.state.gov/www/global/human.rights/1999.hrp.report (last visited Oct. 14, 2000).
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reform, development of the peasant economy, and political autonomy. 7 After
various attempts by the military to eradicate them, they were radicalized and came
to embrace more revolutionary goals. Their political wing, active in the 1980's,
was eliminated through the progressive assassination of its representatives by rightwing extremists.
While self-identified Marxists, the FARC's political pronouncements begin to
reflect the end of the Cold War. 8 They advance the formation of a New Colombia
based on principles of social justice and economic self-determination. Specifically,
they propose institutions for broad political participation, more state control over
the economy, and land redistribution through expropriation: in furtherance of these
objectives the FARC imagines for itself a leadership role. 9 Additionally, the group
considers American interests as antagonistic to their program. They oppose the
Colombian state because of its subservience to U.S. dictates but also because of the
corruption and oligarchy in control. They finance themselves mostly by providing
protection for drug producers and traffickers and by kidnapping civilians for
ransom. 20 The FARC currently holds 42,000 sq. km. of territory in southeastern
Colombia, ceded to them as a good will gesture by the government to initiate peace
talks.
The second largest group is the Uni6n Camilista Ejdrcito de Liberaci6n
Nacional (more commonly known as the ELN) estimated at near 5,000 strong. 2' The
ELN's formation was strongly influenced by the Cuban revolution. Their early
strategy drew on Ernesto Guevara's catalyzing rural "focos." Elenos (as members
of the ELN are known) were also strongly impacted by liberation theology. Some
of their most revered leaders were ex-Catholic priests. The founder, Camilo Torres,
was a priest from an upper middle class family in Bogoti. 22 The group's leader
throughout a large part of its existence was el cura Prez (the priest Manuel Prez),
who died in 1998 of natural causes, in his camp in the mountains of Colombia. The
group's theological leaders, responsible for the ELN's repeated appeals to
international humanitarian law and pronouncements against the drug trade, 23 are

17.

See PIZARRO, supra note 1, at 39.

18.

See, e.g., ALFREDO RANGEL SUAREZ, COLOMBIA: GUERRA EN EL FIN DE SIGLO 27 (1998)

[hereinafter RANGEL]. "[1In a relatively short time, the guerrilla phenomenon in Colombia has radically
changed in nature and dynamic. The guerrillas have gone from being essentially ideological, very poor
in economic resources and with scarce military capacity, to being politically pragmatic - even while
basically maintaining their Marxist ideology, very economically solvent and with increasing military
strength." Id.
19. LA PAZ, supra note 13, at 24-25, 33-34. Of course, these are simply the public statements of
the insurgency force. Substantial discrepancies are known to exist between internal and external FARC
communications. It is not clear whether the FARC would in fact implement a democratic governance
structure, as currently understood, if they secured effective control over the country.
20.

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR WITHOUT QUARTER: COLOMBIAN AND INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW 132 (1998) [hereinafter WAR WITHOUT QUARTER]; see also Hearings,supra note
16, at 16.

21.
22.
23.

See Hearings,supra note 16, at 16.
See generallyWalter J. Broderick, CAMILO TORRES: EL CURA GUERRILLERO (1977).
See LA PAZ, supra note 13, at 24-25, 33-34.
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counterbalanced by a more radical faction with fewer ethical qualms. It is this latter
faction which is expected to gain more control.24
The ELN has recently received widespread attention in 1999 due to a number
of high profile kidnappings. The subversive group hijacked an Avianca airliner en
route from Bucaramanga to Bogotd. And, in 1999, it kidnapped an entire
congregation of churchgoers at the La Maria church outside of Cali. These events
and a number of other related kidnappings were undertaken to pressure the
government to cede to its demand for a second demilitarized zone for peace talks
with the ELN. Serving an economic function as well, kidnapping and extortion are
principal sources of revenue for all guerrilla groups.
In terms of military strategy, the guerrillas principally target towns and villages.
They are more circumspect around the better fortified urban centers and seats of
elite power. Specifically, their war effort is aimed at local police and municipal
officials more so than at the military directly. Overpowering local authorities
ensures their effective control over political offices and area finances.25 Ironically,
the decentralization of political administration following the 1991 Constitution has
worked in their favor. Without a strong state to safeguard the political process and
fiscal integrity, the guerrillas have been able to control local officials and siphon
state funds.
C. The Colombian State's Response
The current administration of Andr6s Pastrana was elected on his platform for
peace. After half a century of guerrilla war, many sectors are convinced that the
only viable option is political negotiation. It appears that the government's
approach is, not unlike the National Front arrangement or the Constitution of 1991,
another political pact to bring the guerrillas within current state institutions. During
his campaign, Pastrana opened channels with the FARC. The image of a
Colombian presidential hopeful meeting with guerrilla leaders caused a sufficient
stir to help turn the electoral tide in Pastrana's favor.
This is not to say that other issues were not important in the 1998 vote. The
prior administration of Ernesto Samper was riddled with scandal and controversy.
Most saliently, Samper was accused of knowingly taking money from drug
24. See RANGEL, supra note 18, at 61-64.
25. See id. at 40-41. Rangel describes it this way: "the guerrilla sends to the new locality which is
going to serve as the center of action for the future new front an organizational and financial
commission composed of a few political cadres whose objective is to explore the territory, establish the
conditions for citizen safety in the zone, find the possible sources of financing and inquire about
community relations with the local police. Afterwards, another commission styled of public order is sent
whose first objective is to eliminate delinquents from the area and whose second purpose - once
obtaining the sympathy of the population as a result of the improved security conditions which those
murders, paradoxically, provoked - is to attack the local police barracks with the goal of neutralizing
them in the urban center. The systematic and reiterated attacks of the guerrilla on police units, with the
objective of causing their withdrawal or to neutralize their activity, have the purpose of monopolizing
the force to impose their own rules of the game to which, sooner or later, all end up adapting and
accommodating." Id.
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traffickers to finance his 1994 presidential campaign.16 High ranking members of
his administration were implicated and went to jail.
After impeachment
proceedings in the Colombian Congress, Samper was absolved of any wrongdoing.
The Congressional vote, however, was not sufficient to quell public outrage at what
seemed convincing proof of the president's involvement. The U.S. government was
not so easily convinced either. Samper's visa was withdrawn, and U.S. relations
were at a decisive low point." Pastrana's opponent in the presidential campaign,
Horacio Serpa, was Samper's former minister of the interior.
In any event, Pastrana's administration has made the peace process his priority
throughout his time in office. Critics question the president's excessive focus to the
detriment of other questions of domestic policy. For one, the Colombian economy
at the end of 1999 was in the middle of one of the worst recessions of the century.2
Still, the president has been personally handling the peace process, with only one
senior aide. 9 With his conservative political credentials, he has been able to get
Colombia's traditional political class behind him." No less important, he has also
established a strong working relationship with President Clinton and the U.S.
administration. His Plan Colombia was elaborated in concert with White House
advisors, and his program is clearly attuned to Washington politics.
Pastrana has thus far maintained the support of the Colombian military. Their
relationship has withstood several blows. Disagreement over the demilitarized zone,
discussed below, reached particularly troubling levels. Furthermore, continuing
accusations of human rights violations also add to existing tensions. The
Colombian military is near 150,000 strong," of which only about 50,000 are actual
26. Ironically, the question of extradition was settled by the 1991 Constitutional Assembly. The
possibility existed that extradition would form part of the final document. The Medellin cartel was
adamant against it. Ultimately decided by secret vote, extradition did not form part of Colombia's 1991
Constitution. However, a subsequent constitutional amendment in 1997, submitted by the Samper
administration, amended the constitution and revived the constitutionality of extradition.
27. PreTaredTestimony Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere
Affairs, 105 Cong. (Aug. 5, 1998) (statement of Michael Shifter) [hereinafter Shifter], available at
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/printdoc (last visited Oct. 14, 2000).
28. See James Wilson, Civil Strife Holds Bogotd in Thrall, FIN. TIMES (London), May 16, 2000, at
52.
29. The first High Commissioner for Peace was Victor G. Ricardo, a career politician. Despite
Pastrana's high priority on the peace process, his hand-picked advisor was often questioned for his lack
of background in this area. Ricardo resigned his post effective late April 2000, under serious death
threats from the paramilitaries. His successor is Camilo G6mez, private secretary to the President since
1998 and already a government negotiator in the current peace process. See Camilo G6mez, Nuevo
comisionadode Paz, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), Apr. 27, 2000.
30. The Pastrana administration weathered an important battle with the Colombian Congress in
May 2000. The crisis was unleashed when the President reacted sternly to evidence of massive fraud by
Congressional leaders. When implicated, high-ranking legislators refused to resign. The President
launched a referendum project for early elections to choose a new Congress. In reaction, legislators lead
by the Liberal opposition proposed to hold the President himself to new elections. Debate turned on
whether the referendum would be effected through Congress or through a citizen-based petition. The
former option more clearly threatened Pastrana, by including the presidency within the new elections.
Ultimately, the Pastrana administration backed down. See Supervivencia o chantage?, EL TIEMPO
(Bogot,, Colom.), May 14, 2000.
31.
James L. Zackrison & Eileen Bradley, ColombianSovereignty Under Siege, in 112 NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 3 (Strategic Forum Series, 1997)
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combatants.32 Colombian officials acknowledge that they lack the training and
intelligence capabilities for effective counterinsurgency operations.33
The military's operations have been mostly reactive - responding to guerrilla
attacks and recovering areas under rebel control.
A strategy of containment has
resulted in military personnel garrisoned across areas of recurrent guerrilla action.
The enemy's greater mobility, though, works to disperse government forces thinly.35
Their outposts have proven quite ineffective at repelling assaults and tracking down
attackers.36 Military offensives, by contrast, are infrequent and then have only
achieved limited success. The overall strategy has been not much of a strategy at
all: responding to flashpoints rather than challenging the guerrillas' strongholds. 7 In
its current configuration, it is apparent that the Colombian military is unable to hold
down the country's irregular forces operating at any one time.
During the early 1990's, then president Cesar Gaviria attempted a more
aggressive course. His "integral war" was intended to uproot all guerrilla groups
rejecting the 1991 constitutional conciliation. In the 60's and 70's as well, Cold
War tensions supported a different strategy. National security doctrines polarized
the conflict and proposed to exterminate the guerrilla threat.3" A peaceful end to the

[hereinafter Zackrison & Bradley], available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strfrom/forumi12.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2000).
32. See Center for International Policy's Demilitarization Program, available at
http://www.cipoline.org/clombia/infocombat.htm#govt (on file with author).
33. Zackrison and Bradley, supra note 31, at 3 (referring to comments of Former Minister of
Defense Juan Carlos Esguerra).
34. Cf RANGEL, supra note 18, at 81-94. Rangel argues that the Colombian military has pursued
a strategy of annihilating the guerrillas, but that it has pursued it ineffectually for lack of resources and
political will. At the same time, however, Rangel acknowledges that the military often falls prey to
passivity and a merely defensive posture. He proposes the progressive weakening of the adversary
through partial but cumulative victories; selecting prime objectives and territories of importance to the
guerrillas and recuperating them for the state; achieving both real and symbolic successes over the
guerrillas' organization, finances and morale, reducing its expectations of growth and denying it the
possibility of success.
35. See Gonzalo de Francisco, La Fuerza Ptiblica y la Estrategia para enfrentar el fen6meno
guerrillero, in RECONOCER LA GUERRA PARA CONSTRUIR LA PAZ 494-96 (Grupo Editorial Norma ed.,
1999). De Francisco describes the guerrillas' "leap of the flea" (salto de la pulga) strategy which places
military posts in the position of splitting their forces to recapture an area of guerrilla attack as well as to
pursue guerrilla forces in retreat. Part of the government's troops are forced to stay behind in the newly
recaptured area to ward off a likely guerrilla "leap" back into the same area. See id.
36. See RANGEL, supra note 18, at 88-94. Rangel warns against the foreseeable, in his estimation,
progression of internal warfare from a guerrilla war to a war of entrenched positions. He argues that the
guerrillas' long-term planning and recent tactical successes support this development. See id.
37. See id. Rangel argues that, taking into consideration the modem guerrilla movement, a
negotiated solution will only be possible if the guerrillas have an incentive to negotiate. Under the
present conditions, no such incentives exist. As such, a military strategy based on limited warfare and
intermediate goals is required. Rangel believes that a focus on territorial strongholds and well-paced
military objectives are key. Only by containing the guerrilla movement, he believes, will peace be
possible. See id.
38. See generallyAlvaro Villarraga Sarmiento, Antecedentesy Elementos de Diagn6stico: Rasgos
del Conflicto Armada y del Derecho Humanitario en Colombia, in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
HUMANITARIO APLICADO (Tercer Mundo eds., 1998) [hereinafter Sarmiento].
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conflict was conceived only in terms of surrender.39 All of these attempts clearly
failed. Colombia's vast mountains and uneven terrain make guerrilla warfare
impossible to eradicate. Furthermore, the guerrillas often enjoy the support of
villagers and farmers who are either willing or forced to assist them. As a result,
the military has defaulted into a defense strategy, which has become increasingly
difficult to uphold.
D. ParamilitaryActivities
Paramilitarism has increased in notoriety in the latter part of the 1990's. Some
of these bands were initiated as self-help groups to protect landowners form
guerrilla violence.'4 Others were begun as private armies to the drug traffickers.
And yet, additional groups were formed as vigilantes engaged in social cleansing of
street children and other undesirables. Now all rather indistinguishable, these have
blossomed into full-fledged fighting forces. Their numbers are estimated at around
5000 to 7000, 4' and a national association claims to represent them. They demand
political standing and a seat at the peace process. 2
The guerrillas are vehemently opposed to the recognition of paramilitaries and
to their participation in peace talks. They assert that, as allies of the state,
paramilitaries are already well-represented by government negotiators.
The
guerrillas have refused to sit at the same table with them.
By some estimates, paramilitaries are deemed responsible for almost 70% of
the human rights abuses in Colombia.43 Their preferred method of warfare is the
massacre" of townspeople suspected of sympathizing with the guerrillas. The
paramilitaries have also targeted assassinations of human rights workers, pro-peace
activists, and even political centrists residing in Colombia's major cities.45 The
39. See Zackrison & Bradley, supra note 31, at 3 (discussing the need to change from traditional
defensive operations based on stationing troops in garrisons to more sustained offensive operations).
40. See CARLOS MEDINA GALLEGO AND MIREYA TtLEZ ARDILA, LA VIOLENCIA
PARAINSTITUCIONAL, PARAMLITAR Y PARAPOLICIAL EN COLOMBIA (Rodriguez Quito ed., 1994)
(attributing the emergence of paramilitarism to outright government policy, resulting from Cold War
national security doctrine and U.S. instigation, to combat the guerrillas. The authors argue that
paramilitarism has organized sectors of civil society as its primary target, the potential base of support
for guerrillas.).
41. See COLOMBIA COUNTRY REPORT, supranote 16, at 16.
42. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 20, at 100. Human Rights Watch has identified
seven distinct groups comprising Colombia's paramilitary forces allied under the name Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia, AUC. Id.
43. See id. at 18.
44. In Colombia, "massacre" is defined as a homicidal action in which there are at least four
deaths. REPUBLIC OF COLOM. MINISTRY OF NAT'L DEFENSE, THE PUBLIC FORCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
COLOMBIA (Mar. 2000). Paramilitaries, or illegal self-defense groups as they are called by the
government, were deemed responsible for 74% of the 551 massacres reported in 1999. Id.
45. The increasingly regional dimensions of the Colombian conflict have been made clear by the
statements of paramilitary leader, Carlos Castaflo, accusing the Venezuelan and Panamanian
governments of assisting the left-wing guerrillas and declaring some members of the Panamian National
Guard to be military objectives. Castaho declaraguerraa GuardiaNacional de Panamd, EL TIEMPO
(Bogota, Colom.), Sept. 13, 1999.
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paramilitaries skill in penetrating even apparently safe zones makes them an
especially feared element of the internal conflict.
These groups are also linked to Colombia's military.'
They are said to
perform the dirty work that regular forces are incapable of because of heightened
national and international scrutiny."7 Indeed, the complicity of Colombia's military
has been documented, not so much in active assistance but more commonly in
failing to prevent paramilitary operations. The strongest objections to international
assistance to Colombia stem from this reported link between the right-wing
terrorists and the state.
E. The Drug Trade
The high point of Colombian drug violence was in the mid 1980's to early
1990's. In response to the threat of extradition to the U.S., the drug traffickers
headed by Pablo Escobar launched an effective war against the government.48
Urban violence, bombings, and kidnapping were at the heart of the drug traffickers'
intimidation methods. A series of high-profile kidnappings and assassinations led
to intense negotiations in which Escobar gave himself up in return for not being
extradited to the United States. After a short time in prison, Escobar escaped and
was killed while trying to flee. The demise of Escobar precipitated the end of his
Medellin cartel.
The other major drug organization in the country, the Cali drug cartel, was
soon to follow suit. Stung by a number of government operations, the drug lords
were progressively jailed by Colombian police. With the virtual extermination of
the major menaces, drug trafficking became more decentralized or at least went
underground in the latter part of the 1990's. Not until some recent arrests in 1999
has the fearsome power of the drug lords again erupted into full view.
Nonetheless, drug trafficking is an important factor in the civil conflict. It has
been linked to the operations of all of Colombia's political actors.49 The guerrillas
especially are tarred by charges of drug conspiracy if not outright production and

46. See WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 20, at 100. The Colombian government sternly
denies this assertion while maintaining that isolated links between military commanders and
paramilitaries have occurred in the past. Government statistics demonstrate that public forces have
captured 741 paramilitaries and inflicted 98 casualties while in combat. Additionally, these numbers
reflect an upward trend during the past year in terms of total captures and casualties of illegal armed
groups (subversion and paramilitaries combined). THE PUBLIC FORCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
COLOMBIA, supra note 44.
47. See generally, WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 20.
48. For a gripping account of this period of Colombian history, see GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ,
NEWS OF A KIDNAPPING (Knopf 1997).
49. By some accounts, the Colombian military is not by any means exempt from this charge. On
the contrary, even Colombian leaders concede the military's drug links. Sergio G6mez Maseri, Ayuda
de E.U peligra en narcotizarse:PiedadC6rdoba, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), Oct. 15, 1999 (citing
Colombian Senator Piedad C6rdoba: "What is ridiculous to think is that an army like ours, which is the
one that is most involved in drug-trafficking, would take these resources to fight against what passes
right under their very noses.").
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trade.5" Both U.S. and Colombian officials have 'routinely referred to the rebels as
narco-guerrillas. 5 1 It is estimated that 30% to 40% of their revenues come from the
drug trade.52 Paramilitary groups, as noted above, also have strong drug ties.53
Indeed, some of the most feared of these are connected to the drug lords' private
armies.
F. PastPeaceInitiatives:Repression or Co-optation
The Colombian peace process has had a tortuous history and a number of false
starts. Serious initiatives in recent history began in the 1980's with the election of a
rather conciliatory administration. The presidency of Belisario Betancur (19821986) attempted to negotiate with all existing rebel factions at the time.54 Truce
agreements were reached in 1984 with the FARC and several others, although not
with the ELN.55 They lasted less than a year. 6
New initiatives were not undertaken until late in the administration of Virgilio
Barco (1986-1990)." 7 By this time, a number of guerrilla groups had formed an
50. According to reports by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), that agency "has not
reached the conclusion that the FARC are drug-traffickers." However, the DEA has no doubt that these
groups are associated with drug-traffickers, offering them protection and extorting them. Sergio G6mez
Maseri, 'Farc no son narcotraficantes':DEA, EL TIEMPO (Bogot,, Colom.), Aug. 2, 1999 (reporting
comments by Donnie Marshall, DEA Administrator, before the House Subcomm. on.Crime and Drugs).
51. See also MALCOLM DEAS, EL PROCESO DE PAZ COLOMBIANO, 1982-1985 Y SUS
IMPLICACIONES PARA CENTROAMtRICA. Centro de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de los
Andes. (Sept.-Oct. 1988). "The connection between the [guerrilla] movement and cocaine traffic is not
an invention of the ambassador of the United States."
52. See Hearings,supra note 16, at 2 (testimony of Under Sec. Pickering).
53. See Television Interview by Dario Arizmendi with Carlos Castaflo, Colombian paramilitary
leader (Mar. 1, 2000) (admitting publicly that 70% of his organization's resources hail from drugrelated activities).
54. See generally DEAS, supra note 51. Deas notes Betancur's emphasis on expanding political
participation as an objective of peace negotiations. In contrast to Pastrana, Betancur's approach was to
emphasize the uniquely national nature of the problem and its resolution. Id.
55. See generally Sarmiento, supra note 38.
56. One of the main criticisms of Belisario Betancur's peace attempts is that it did not have the
support of the state institutions, most importantly the armed forces. His peace initiatives were
perceived as based simply on his indomitable will. Also significant was the brutal taking of the Palace
of Justice (seat of the Supreme Court) by the M-19 guerrilla forces in 1985. The bloody recapture of the
building by the armed forces, independent of Betancur's control, crippled the already teetering peace
plan. See JESUS ANTONIO BEJARANO AVILA, LA POLITICA DE PAZ DURANTE LA ADMINISTRACION
BARCO. In EL GOBIERNO BARCO: POLITiCA, ECONOMIA, Y DESARROLLO SOCIAL EN COLOMBIA 198690. Coordinated by Malcolm Deas and Carlos Ossa. Fedesarrollo and Fondo Cultural Cafetero:
Colombia (1994) (hereinafter POLITICA).
57. Virgilio Barco's peace policy was double-pronged. First, it aimed at re-establishing
negotiations with the guerrillas. Second, it aimed at institutional reform: obtaining support for the peace
process from all sectors of the state and armed forces; opening the institutions of the state to more
accessible and democratic participation; changing the policy of repression against labor strikes, student
uprisings, peasant demonstrations and other forms of political expression; extending the reach of the
state to marginalized areas and communities. The second prong was an effort to address the failures
attendant Belisario Betancur's attempts as well as to undercut the guerrillas' raison d'etre. The reality
of this period was, though, that a dirty war by the armed forces against guerrillas turned political
participants, human rights defenders, and even plain democrats obliterated the possibilities for peace.
See id.
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umbrella organization, the Sim6n Bolivar National Guerrilla Coordinator. Yet, a
peace settlement was reached separately with the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19)
band. 8 Subsequent agreements were also obtained from the Movimiento Quintin
Lame, the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores and the Ejdrcito Popular de
Liberaci6n 9 toward the end of Barco's administration and beginning of Cdsar
Gaviria's term (1990-1994). The FARC and ELN did not participate, signaling the
end of a unified guerrilla stance.
Nonetheless, negotiations paved the way for a new constitution. In 1991,
human rights, judicial guarantees and political participation were high on the list of
former guerrillas, some of them elected to the national constituent assembly.
Replacing Colombia's long-standing 1886 constitution, the new founding document
offers a new basis for political participation. The FARC and ELN, however, did not
take part in its adoption. By late 1991 and then 1992, peace talks were re-initiated,
but under intensified combat they soon stalled.' By 1993, Gaviria launched a full
military offensive against the remaining guerrilla groups.
Peace initiatives were re-taken by Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) but never
crystallized.6 The most recent round is now led by Andrds Pastrana (1998-2002),
keeping to his campaign promises.62 Preliminary talks actually began, as mentioned
above, during his presidential race. Pastrana was photographed shaking hands with
the country's most prominent rebels on their turf. It was the first time, but not the
last, that a leading figure of traditional Colombian politics would meet with the
guerrillas on their terms. It signaled a humbling step but a significant one for
national reconciliation. Pastrana appeared to have somehow found common ground
with the guerrillas.
The period since then has marked a renewed determination across Colombian
society to achieve peace. From governmental agencies to concerned citizens, all
have joined in pressing for an end to the war. Nonetheless, during this same time,
rebel forces have continued and even increased their attacks on the civilian
population. Individual and group kidnappings are a common guerrilla tactic. The
ransoms extorted are a major source of financing.63 Despite continuing attacks, 6'

58. See id. at 95. Bejarano notes that the concessions obtained by the M-19 were spare:
advantages relating to the nomination of its candidates to elections, a pardon for criminal sentences,
assistance with the reinsertion of its troops in civil society, and some financial resources for areas
formerly zones of conflict.
59. Negotiation of a peace settlement with the EPL produced a split within its ranks. The
majoritarian strand made peace. A dissident group continues to wage guerrilla war. See id. at 96. While
not one of the main groups, not slated for separate negotiations, they would still need to be incorporated
within one of the tracks of the current peace process.
60. See generally Sarmiento, supra note 38.
61. The most ambitious attempt made was a secret meeting in Spain by Samper officials and
representatives of the ELN. When news of the secret negotiation attempt was leaked to the press, the
ELN refused to proceed. See RANGEL, supra note 18, at 63.
62. See Doctor Andrs Pastrana Arango, Discurso de Posesi6n como Presidente de la Rep~blica,
Santafd de Bogotd (Aug. 7, 1998) ("Por eso, ante todo, quiero la paz, que es paz y pan.").
63. COLOMBIA COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 16. See also Larry Rohter, Colombian Rebel Group
Gains Notice, Loses Sympathy, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1999, at A3. Note kidnapping of congregation in

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTL LAW

[Vol. 16:1

delays, and even legal obstacles threatening to derail its momentum, the framework
for peace talks is in place.65
G. CurrentPeace Processes
The peace process has advanced on two separate tracks: one with the ELN and
one with the FARC. A first level of contacts was initiated by President Pastrana
himself with the FARC. His meeting with guerrilla leaders during the presidential
campaign were the starting point. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Pastrana
cleared the way for peace talks by declaring a de-militarized zone in southeastern
Colombia. As a concession to the FARC's conditions for negotiation, the national
military was completely withdrawn from five municipalities (approximately 42,000
square kilometers). Despite its name, the de-militarized zone places the FARC in
control of this area, and increasingly they have assumed a range of governmental
functions.
This concession sparked considerable controversy both inside and outside
Colombia. Most importantly were questions over the expanse of area and activities
of the guerrillas within the zone. Pastrana's first Minister of Defense and a number
of high ranking military officers ultimately resigned over this issue. Not unrelated,
the U.S. government voiced significant concern over the de-militarized zone's use
as a staging ground for drug-trafficking. It was believed that the United States might
attempt to frustrate this step of the peace process in order to uphold its own national
security concerns. Ultimately, the State Department issued a statement that it would
not interfere in the Colombian peace process.
On a parallel track have been contacts with the ELN. The initiative was headed
not by the government but by representatives of civil society and the ELN meeting
in Mainz Germany under the auspices of the Catholic Church. The group was able
to negotiate an international humanitarian agreement'and agree on a rough agenda
for further peace talks.
Negotiations with the ELN later broke down over the question of their own
demilitarized zone. The ELN argued it should be treated no less than the FARC
and therefore should be granted a safe zone to hold its peace talks. The government
rejected the demand. Since then the ELN has stepped up their aggression to force
the government's hand. They have undertaken a series of high- profile, mass
kidnappings. However, instead of gaining them leverage, their actions have been

Cali and kidnapping of Avianca passengers on flight from Bucaramanga and kidnapping of
businessmen in Barranquila.
64. For example, the town of Gutierrez, in the department of Cundinamarca (near Bogoti), was
the site of a guerrilla offensive approximately ten days before formal negotiations are to begin with Las
Farc. COLOMBIA COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 16, at 33. Also, noted peace activists such as Jesils
Antonio Bejarano and Jaime Garz6n were assassinated, presumably by paramilitaries. Id. at 13.
Numerous other scholars, quoted throughout this article, have narrowly escaped with their lives.
65. See La paciencia del Gobierno tiene limites, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), July 22, 1999.
Pastrana notes that the government's patience and the patience of the Colombian people is not endless.
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widely condemned throughout Colombian society." The ELN continues to refuse
further negotiations until a de-militarized zone is declared. The latest proposals by
certain sectors in the government are that the national convention - a sort of
constitutional assembly envisaged for peace talks with the ELN - proceed despite
the retention of the kidnapped and despite the government's refusal to concede a
second demilitarized zone.67 Recently, Pastrana's government has come around to
the idea of a separate de-militarized zone. As this article was going to print,
Pastrana's government acceded to an ELN de-militarized zone, despite stiff
resistance from inhabitants of the area that would actually be de-militarized.
The main stumbling block to peace is the issue of Colombia's traditional
political system. In this respect, Pastrana's strategy is a replay of the traditional
mechanisms: this time extended to some of the state's most recalcitrant foes. The
guerrillas on their part are more resistant to the traditional process of co-optation.
Wisened by past peace processes and experimentation with their own political
parties, the subversives are rejecting a pact with the government that would merely
provide access to the current electoral system. Such a position is not unreasonable.
Colombia's history demonstrates that electoral politics are ineffective for
instituting major change. Victories are too dependent on personal connections,
economic influences, and established party machineries. Furthermore, the physical
extermination of Uni6n Patri6tica members in the past, the FARC's political party,
serves as a harsh reminder of the risks of trading in arms for political campaigns.68
For these reasons, guerrillas are making claims for separate territory, questioning
majority voting, and demanding financial autonomy through their own taxing
authority.
III. THE STATUS OF GUERRILLAS
In line with their extensive control over towns and rural areas, the guerrillas
claim the legal standing of belligerents at war. These groups profess to have met
the formal requirements stated under international law. Belligerency status within
traditional legal doctrine signifies that the guerrillas would enjoy equal standing
with the Colombian state. It constitutes a prior step, although not by any means a
necessary one, to claim full recognition as the sole government of Colombia or,
alternatively, to claim recognition as a separate state within the current nation's

66. Indeed, even the Catholic hierarchy threatened members of the ELN with excommunication if
they did not release those kidnapped during religious services at La Maria Church in Cali. See Hostage
Takers Excommunicated, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999, at 8.
67. See Contacts Between the Government and the ELN are reestablished, EL TIEMPO (BogotA,
Colom.), Oct. 22, 1999.
68. The Peace Process with the FARC at San Vicente del Caguan has been delayed numerous
times. Indeed, the government was required to extend the initial 6 month declaration of a de-militarize
zone - a FARC condition for the peace talks - since negotiations had not even begun at the end of
that period. The peace talks were definitively set to begin on July 7, 1999. Three days before, they were
indefinitely postponed because of the FARC's rejection of international observers in the de-militarized
zone.
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territory. Interestingly, one of the earliest instances of a recognition of belligerency
occurred during the Latin American wars of independence.69
For the Colombian state, a state of belligerency recognized by the international
community would be a serious reversal in the legal and institutional weapons at its
disposal. Belligerency status would in theory terminate its access to external
assistance or even lead to foreign intervention on the side of the guerrillas. Any
explicit action or implication by the government of the conditions of belligerency
would, arguably, propel such a result: it would provide third-party states with the
basis to accord the guerrillas belligerent rights. Thus, the government has been
exceedingly cautious in its range of action. Its foreign policy, treaty ratification,
and dealings with the rebels are marked by an over-riding apprehension with this
question. So much so that the government, across a number of issues discussed
below, is hamstrung for fear of losing its sovereignty over the conflict.
However, this preoccupation with belligerency is the result of a misreading of
the current state of legal play. An idiosyncratic interpretation of international law,
predominating in Colombia, is responsible for this misconception. In reviving the
figure of belligerency and its relevance to the state's international standing,
Colombian publicists have, wittingly or unwittingly, misdirected government policy
and restricted its range of action. Fearing an erosion of its authority, the state has
been incapacitated from taking action which might lead to internal transformation
and which may lead to alternatives to armed conflict.
This Section and Section IV, below, examine the partialized renditions of
international law which are held to be authoritative in Colombia. The analysis
reveals the political orientation advanced by what I call here Colombia's orthodox
internationalism. It also reveals the flawed legal arguments that support it.
A. Ratification ofProtocolHl
An example of the impact of orthodox thought on government policy is
Colombia's delayed ratification of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.7"
International humanitarian treaties, such as Protocol II, are the main body of law
applicable to the Colombian conflict." More specifically, the centerpiece of
international regulation is common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.72
69. The U.S. and Great Britain, de facto if not de jure, recognized toward the end of the Latin
American revolutions the belligerency status of nationalist movements. See HERSH LAUTERPACHT,
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 175-82 (Cambridge University Press 1947) [hereinafter
LAUTERPACHT].

70.

Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions was adopted in 1994 in Colombia, pursuant to Ley 171

de 1994, constitutionally reviewed and approved by CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-225/95.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol I) June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16
I.LM. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. See generally, Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol IT.
History andScope, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 29 (1983) [hereinafter Junod].
71.
For an overview of international humanitarian law, see DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR

(Adam Roberts & Richard Guelffeds., Clarendon Press, 1982).
72. Colombia adopted the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1960 (Ley 5 de 1960).
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This provision sets guidelines on the conduct of internal wars. Protocol II of 1977
expands upon the letter of common Article 3.
The ratification of Protocol II was stalled in Colombia for many years.73 It was
ultimately adopted, effective February 16, 1996," 4 but its effectiveness is still the
subject of continuing debate. The Protocol is resisted for fear of undermining the
state." To recognize the applicability of international humanitarian law, and
specifically of Protocol II, is portrayed as conceding the existence of a state of
belligerency. This idea is fueled by a quite peculiar perspective on international
law. 76
This is not to say that commentators worldwide are not divided on the question
of Protocol II's threshold of applicability. 7" In fact, there has been significant
debate over whether its text mirrors the same requirements as for belligerency or

73. The Protocol is the extension of obligations of parties in a non-international armed conflict. It
was developed in response to the abbreviated guidelines provided in Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.
74. See FRITS KALSHOVEN, El Protocolo 11, la CDDHy Colombia, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
HUMANITARIO APLICADO 37-78 (Tercer Mundo Editores 1998) (Kalshoven recounts the Colombian
governments initially strong aversion to Protocol II and the subsequent sea change in policy. Passing
Protocol II was an essential element of the Samper administration's peace policy) [hereinafter
KALSHOVEN].
See also Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in
International Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1999)
[hereinafter Carillo-Suarez], noting the large role played by national and international nongovernmental organizations pressuring for passage of Protocol I1).
75. See ALEJANDRO VALENCIA VILLA, DERECHO HUMANITARIO PARA COLOMBIA 89 (Defensoria
del Pueblo 1994) [hereinafter VALENCIA VILLA]; see also Hketor Charry Samper, La Aplicaci6n del
Protocolo II de Derecho Hunanitario, EL TIEMPO (Bogota, Colom.), Feb. 8, 1989 cited in, Alejandro
Valencia Villa, La Humanizaci6n de ia Guerra (Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Conflicto Armado
en Colombia. Ediciones Uniandes-Tercer Mundo Editores 1991). (Colombia's ambassador to the
Diplomatic Conference responsible for Protocol I1 stated that the instrument's vague scope of
applicability left the door open for third states to interpret and thus "place a State in international
difficulties of diverse order."); see generally Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 74.
76. For example, Arturo Carrillo-Suarez describes the efforts of a particular NGO to dispel the
idiosyncratic views on belligerency which long frustrated the adoption of Protocol II. See CarrilloSuarez, supra note 74, at 49. ("One well-known NGO, the Colombian Section of the Andean
Commission of Jurists organized a seminar series over the course of several years ... dedicated to the
subject of applying international human rights and humanitarian law instruments in Colombia. These
influential seminars brought together renowned experts who exposed the Colombian authorities and
public to the mechanics of international law and its interplay with domestic jurisdiction. At the time,
this was a largely unfamiliar and unexplored domain for the majority of the Colombian legal
community." Id. What was "unfamiliar and unexplored" was not international law but a non-orthodox
version of international law.
77. See e.g., Junod, supra note 70, at 32. "The work of the Conference of Government Experts
showed how many divergent views and possible solutions existed. Six variants were formulated, based
on thirteen proposals. The first was based on the view that a single Protocol should apply to all types of
armed conflict without distinguishing between them; the other five, which only applied to noninternational armed conflicts, ranged from the broadest conceivable definition, covering all situations,
including those where the level of strife was very low, to the narrowest possible definition, covering
only very intense conflicts with all the material characteristics of a war. Taking the views that were
expressed into account, the ICRC attempted in its draft to propose a formula defining the characteristics
of non-international armed conflicts, while remaining sufficiently general and flexible to be able to
apply to all such situations." Id.
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even civil war.78 These debates draw on a wide range of interpretive techniques
which are used to argue either for or against a certain threshold. My aim, here,
however is not to partake in this debate or even to place Colombian scholars within
this larger discourse: although the mainstream clearly supports a high threshold.79
Rather, it is to analyze the basis and potential motivation for such a legal argument
in Colombia.
Colombian governments and particularly its military, backed by mainstream
legal doctrine, long resisted the adoption of Protocol 11.8" The relevance of Protocol
II to any actual event occurring in Colombia was consistently denied." Former
President Cesar Gaviria asserted:
In relation to Protocol II .

the conditions for its application in

Colombia are not present, . . . ratherthe present circumstancesfall under

'internal tensions, internal disturbances, such as riots, sporadic and
isolated acts of violence and other analogous acts, that are not armed
82
conflicts' and as such the norms of this protocol are not applicable.
As a result, it was argued, there was no reason for its adoption. 3
This argument may seem merely a disingenuous denial of events, considering
Colombia's embattled state. 4 Key to its significance, however, is the particular
understanding of international law it reflects. At the heart of the Colombian
government's objection were formal notions of the legal distinctions between
insurgency and belligerency.85 While these doctrines on intemal conflicts are now
quite obsolete in international practice, they are crucially important in Colombia.
78. See, -e.g., Carillo-Suarez, supra note 74, at 66-91 (Carrillo-Suarez carefully delineates the
contours of this debate).
79. On a peripheral note, the most disputed material element of applicability, territorial control,
faces strong authority against a high threshold, according to the International Committee for the Red
Cross's Commentaries on Protocol I: "If the insurgent armed groups are organized in accordance with
the requirements of the Protocol, the extent of territory they can claim to control will be that which
escapes the control of the government armed forces." Noted in Protocol I, supra note 70.
80. See generally Sarmiento, supra note 38.
81. See, e.g. Carillo-Suarez, supra note 74, at 88-89. "[T]he experience in Colombia has been
that certain humanitarian law experts will quote several of the critical academic arguments... in order
to sustain that Protocol In does not apply to the conflict there as a matter of law, despite clear, objective
evidence to the contrary. It is disingenuous to accept that state practice shapes international law without
recognizing the basic role of international law scholars in shaping this very practice under certain
circumstances. Unfortunately, the aforementioned experts provide the Colombian state with the grounds
for justifying its entrenched policy against acknowledging Protocol H's legal applicability, and not the
other way around." Id.
82. Quoted in ALEJANDRO VALENCIA VILLA, supra note 75, at 101.
83. See generally VALENCIA VILLA.
84. Ivn Orozco Abad finds the government's then stated reasons against ratification of Protocol II
to be unconvincing. Orozco notes that the then-current peace talks in Caracas with the Sim6n Bolivar
Guerrilla Coordinator proceeded on the acknowledged basis of the guerrillas' "politico-territorial
dominion" over parts of the country. See Ivin Orozco Abad, Etica y Proceso de Paz, in
COMBATIENTES, REBELDES Y TERRORISTAS: GUERRA Y DERECIO EN COLOMBIA 219 (1992).
85. See generally MARCO GERARDO MONROY CABRA, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO
(Editorial Temis S.A. 2d ed. 1986).
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They are seen as marking the difference between the success and failure of the
guerrilla uprising. They are a key element of the government's long-standing (now
modified) position against internationalizing the civil conflict.
The language of Protocol II is quoted below:
This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing
conditions or application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not
covered by... (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armedforces or
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over apart of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.6
For Colombian internationalists, the elements of "control over territory," an
"organized administrative structure" and "the ability to carry out the obligations
under Protocol II" are seen as troublesome. They parallel the traditional elements
of belligerency too closely. 7 Thus, ratifying Protocol II would bring the
government one step closer to agreeing to its current applicability in Colombia and
so conceding the existence of a state of belligerency. The text of Protocol II itself
rejects this reading."8 Instead, it calls for its application according solely to the
document's internal provisions. The objective is to widen the scope of applicability
of international humanitarian law to all internal conflicts. At the same time,
Protocol II attempts to avoid the precise situation feared by Colombian
governments: that the treaty's implementation will become the basis for rebels
claiming an upgraded legal status. 9 Still, while not the only interpretation and

86. See Protocol II, supra note 70, at 1443.
87. See generally VALENCIA VILLA, supra note 82; see also MARCO GERARDO MONROY CABRA,
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PtJBLICO at 134-35 (3d ed. 1995). Prof. Monroy Cabra's textbooks states
that one of the effects following a recognition of belligerency is the application of international
humanitarian law, especially the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Protocols of 1977. This
follows a discussion in which the constitutive elements of belligerency are described in essentially the
same terms as in Protocol 11,Article 1. See id.
88. See Protocol II, supra note 70, at 1443-1444.
89. See INT'L COMM. ON THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949 (1987); see also INT'L COMM. ON THE RED CROSS, supra note 76, at 1322. With respect
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the proceedings register the delegates' concerns with common
Article 3, potentially granting insurgents greater political standing. The issue was raised in terms of
implicit recognition of belligerent rights through the acknowledgment of common Article 3
applicability. The text of common Article 3 was written explicitly to reject its use as a predicate for
granting belligerency rights. In any case, this historical discussion reflects the interest in belligerency
doctrine immediately post-WWII. However, the discussion did not extend to contemporary practices.
Even by the time of Protocol l's negotiation, the ICRC's Commentary relates "[t]he institution of
recognition of belligerency has proved to be extremely difficult to apply in practice and has given rise to
many controversies. [I]t is often, though incorrectly, invoked as a consequence of the application of
common Article 3 and of Protocol I." Id.
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possibly not the most authoritative one, orthodox publicists equated the adoption of
Protocol II with the granting of belligerency status to the guerrillas."'
The account of law that follows is not intended as a doctrinal argument, in
itself, either in favor or against the guerrillas' belligerency claims. A principal
point of this article is that doctrinal arguments may be forcefully made both for and
against recognizing a state of belligerency in Colombia, without any neutral way of
deciding between them.9 The purpose of this succinct description, though, is to
frame the general contours of the doctrine. Commentators have differed as to its
specific content and attendant effects. But, for the most part, its elements are
traditionally described as: an armed conflict of a general character; insurgents
occupying and administering a substantial portion of the national territory;
insurgent hostilities conducted in accordance with the rules of war and under a
responsible authority; and finally, circumstances that necessarily precipitate thirdparty states, in defense of their sovereign interests, to recognize the belligerency of
the irregular forces.9"

90. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 74, at 44. Kalvoshen argues that H&tor Charry Samper, the
Colombian delegate to the Diplomatic Conference which drafted Protocol II, attempted to insert the
granting of belligerency status as a condition to Protocol I's applicability. At a minimum, Samper
attempted to make the Protocol's applicability subject to state discretion. His amendment, which was
not approved, read: "The determination of the conditions referred to above shall be an issue for the State
in which the conflict occurs." Id.
91.
Belligerency doctrine offers authority for both sides. Some examples of the rules, many of
which can cut either way, include: (1) formal recognition by an incumbent government entails thirdparty state recognition as well; (2) an incumbent government taking the posture of a belligerent, with
respect to an internal movement, automatically implies recognition; (3) an attempt by the incumbent
government to assume the position of a belligerent, even if unsuccessful, such as establishing an
ineffective naval blockade, results in belligerent status automatically conferred; (4) individual thirdparty states make independent calculations - not subject to the determination of a different or
incumbent government - as to whether the factual conditions of the belligerency have in fact been met;
(5) even admission of certain belligerency-type characteristics by the incumbent government does not
result in extending full belligerency rights. Drawing on one or another of these interpretations, factual
assertions may also cut either way. For example, the Colombian government's actions to date could
qualify as recognition: e.g. the declared war on narco-guerrillas; ex-President Cesar Gaviria's 1990
"integral war;" and, the engagement of broad sectors of civilians (paramilitaries) in combat; official
sanctioning of self-defense groups (Convivir). Jailing of insurgents, beyond their purely criminal
sentences (to the extent this occurs), may also constitute a recognition of their status as belligerents.
See, e.g. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 158-226. Contrary fact-based arguments also abound: the
guerrillas do not control territory uninterruptedly (taken a step further, guerrilla warfare may simply not
satisfy the requirements for belligerency); the guerrillas do not adhere to international humanitarian law;
they are active in the drug trade; they kidnap civilians for ransom; the guerrillas have not established
stable governmental offices (the reason for U.S. refusal to extend belligerency rights to Cuban
insurrection of 1868-78); and, no third-party state finds itself in need of extending international status
(beyond acknowledging their insurgent standing) in order to protect their sovereign interests (the reason
for Great Britain and the U.S. to refuse belligerency rights to Polish rebels of 1831 and Hungarian
revolution of 1848).
92. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) [hereinafter CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT] ; see also
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 176.
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Traditionally, the distinctions between rebellion, insurgency and belligerency
were intended to regulate outside intervention in a national conflict.93 While none
of these categories are hermetic, they attempt to distinguish purely domestic affairs
from subjects of international concern. Localized rebellions come purely within the
state's jurisdiction. More generalized revolts amount to an insurgency when
recognized as such by the government or a third-party state. Still, they are subject
to the full force of the law of the state in question. Additionally, incumbent
governments retain a monopoly over international support, even if foreign states
decide how much, if any, support. It is only when an internal war rises to the level
of a recognized belligerency, however, that third-party states may openly side with
the state's opponents or decide to remain neutral as between them.
Generally, belligerency standing signifies that internal conflict has escalated to
the level of a full-scale international war.' Incumbent governments have wide
discretion to decide whether or not to recognize a condition of belligerency.95 This
recognition may be made explicitly through a declaration of war. Or, recognition by
an incumbent, government may be implicit by way of government blockade of a
national port, prisoner exchange, or agreement to a peace treaty.' Recognition by
an incumbent government confers certain rights and obligations on the insurgents as
well as on the government itself. The chief benefit for the government is that it
eschews responsibility for the acts of insurgents to third-party states and their
citizens. Convention has it that a recognition of belligerency relieves the incumbent
government of responsibility for military and political acts of opposing forces.97 The
government is then also free to prosecute its efforts in terms of a full-scale war.
Fewer legal protections are owed by the state to inhabitants under or loyal to
belligerents.
Belligerent forces, under most accounts, have rights as external enemies with
full protections for prisoners of war and the complete range of the laws of war.9"
The latter constitutes the main policy rationale for recognizing states of
belligerency, now attenuated by the extension of humanitarian norms to internal
See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT, supra note 92, art. II; see also Convention of Havana, Feb. 20,
FALK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 11 (1971)
[hereinafter FALK].
93.

1928, art. 11;see generally RICHARD A.
94.

See NORMAN J. PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPANISH CIVIL

STRIFE 7-23 (1939) [hereinafter PADELFORD].
95. Conventional doctrinal writers differ as to the conditions; however, there is authority for
concluding that incumbent governments may declare a state of belligerency independent of the
underlying factual situation. That is, the conditions restricting recognition by foreign governments
would not apply. See generally CHARLES ZORGBIBE, LA GUERRE CIVILE (1975).
96. Id. at 36-47.
97. See PADELFORD, supra note 94, at 2-3, 197; cf. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 94, at 247-48
(Lauterpacht argues that not only are incumbent governments not responsible to foreign states for the
acts of belligerent forces but they are also not responsible for acts of insurgents in areas 'not under its
actual control.').
98. Other rights attaching to the attainment of belligerency status include "the right to obtain
credit abroad, to enter foreign ports, to maintain blockades, to engage in visit and search procedures,
and to confiscate contraband." Richard A. Falk, Janus Tormented: The InternationalLaw ofInternal
War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 205 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1964).
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conflicts. Belligerent rights also include, vis-a-vis the recognizing state, the right to
visit and search neutral merchant ships and to condemn vessels breaching a
blockade or carrying contraband or munitions to the enemy.
It is argued that once an incumbent government takes action amounting to a
recognition of belligerency all other states are bound to follow suit.99 This position
is a main premise of orthodox scholars in Colombia. Their scrutiny of
governmental action is justified on these grounds. According to this line of
thinking, foreign states may find themselves under the legal duty to recognize the
guerrillas and terminate any assistance to the incumbent government, based on the
Colombian government's dealings with the rebel forces.
Traditionally, foreign states may make a Separate belligerency determination,
even if the incumbent government does not, provided the factual preconditions
(enumerated above) exist. Once that step is taken, recognizing states would be
expected to refrain from assisting either side, if they are to remain uninvolved in the
conflict. They may, for example, agree to respect blockades on commercial
shipping erected by the rebels. They may also agree to look only to the belligerent
community for injury to their citizens and their property. Of course foreign states
could recognize a belligerency situation only to then forsake neutrality and join one
or the other party's struggle.' °
During the twentieth century the soundness of belligerency doctrine was
thoroughly challenged. Even conventional scholars of the discipline acknowledged
its vast malleability.'' In early debates, polemic focused not so much on the
elements of the legal doctrine, which were generally agreed, but on whether the
doctrine was legal at all." 2 Legalists insisted that once the factual preconditions
were ascertained, third-party states were under a duty to recognize the belligerency

99. See generally Arnold D. McNair, The Law Relating to the Civil War in Spain, 53 LAW Q.
REV. 471 (Oct. 1937) [hereinafter McNair]; see also George Grafton Wilson, Insurgency and
InternationalMaritime Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 53 (1907) (a foreign state is not bound to recognize
an act of an insurgent as proper because some other foreign state has recognized the insurgents as
belligerents).
100. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 175-76. 101. See W. E. HALL, A TREATISE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-39 (1924) (maintaining that
belligerency "is from a legal point of view a concession of pure grace"); see also HILAIRE MCCOUBREY
& NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CIVIL WARS

72-74 (1995).

102. Even the traditional controversy over constitutive versus declaratory theories of recognition
understates the skepticism over belligerency doctrine. That is, even the more legalistic theory, holding
the status of belligerency to be created upon the satisfaction of its conditions with recognition merely
acting to acknowledge this situation, must contend with the fact that belligerency vis-i-vis a third-party
state arises by definition only when that state's sovereign interests are affected. See TI-CHIANG CHEN,
THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW OF RECOGNITION: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PRACTICE IN GREAT

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 364-68 (L.C. Green, 1951)) (attempting, in an effort to defend the

legal nature of belligerency rights, to distinguish between objective conditions, which are clearly legal,
and subjective conditions, which the author attempts to minimize); cf LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at
77-78 (arguing that the "affect on sovereign interests" element, which is part of the preconditions of
belligerency, does not defeat the legal objectivity of the doctrine-it merely narrows the scope of thirdparty states which are in a position to decide the question). In this case, however, the legal duty which
insurgents may then claim is quite limited in scope.
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of insurgents."0 3 Critics, on the other hand, maintained that no legal right existed on
the part of insurgents and conversely that the decision to recognize by third-party
states conformed only to their own sovereign interests." °
The doctrine's
unworkability as an objective legal rule is typically exemplified by the events
surrounding the Spanish Civil War." 5 There, the belligerency status of Franco's
Nationalist forces was never recognized, notwithstanding the insurgents' ultimate
and complete success in the war. 6 Moreover, even the fact that they controlled
over half the territory during
the conflict was not enough to secure the recognition
07
of their belligerency status.°
Doctrinal disagreements were numerous in the first half of the twentieth
century. These debates show the existence of significant legal authority contrary to
the orthodox positions expressed in Colombia.'
Again, my objective here is not to
103. The most sophisticated proponent of this position was Hersh Lauterpacht, who based his claim
on the actual practice of states. Despite the abundance of counter-evidence, he attempted to craft a
legal duty chiefly from the practices of the United States and Great Britain to respect incumbent
governments' blockades of certain national ports held by insurgents. Lauterpacht believed that "[o]n
occasions governments emphasize the wide element of discretion open to them in the matter
(belligerency determinations). But the discretion which they invoke is discretion in estimating the
existence of the conditions of recognition as postulated by international law. They do not appeal to an
arbitrary liberty of action after the presence of those conditions has been clearly ascertained"
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 158 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Lauterpacht espoused the
normative principle, the backbone of the doctrine that the right to national independence, in the absence
of international institutionality capable of securing the fundamental rights of individuals, required that
internal conflicts result in the neutrality or non-intervention of third-party states. In other words,
incumbent governments and insurgents should be left to their own devices, even prior to the satisfaction
of belligerency conditions: "any unilateral and extended grant of advantages to the lawful government
amounts, even prior to the recognition of the belligerency of the insurgents, to interference and to a
denial of the right of the nation to decide for itself' by a physical contest, if necessary, between the rival
forces: the nature and the form of its government. This is especially so when some but not all of the
requirements of recognition of belligerency are present. Id.at 233. For Lauterpacht, anything other
than non-intervention in intemal conflict would amount to an interference in national independence.
Thus, his belligerency doctrine argues for its quality as a legal duty incumbent upon third-parties and
for a relatively low threshold.
104. See McNair, supra note 99, at 471; see also PADELFORD, supra note 94, at 8 ("belligerent
rights are accorded when the factual situation and the self-interest of foreign states coincide in such a
manner as to make the move expedient or necessary").
105. See PADELFORD, supra note 94, at 119 (Speaking of the Spanish Civil War, "[the] 'normal
practice' in time of insurgency,... the established government should have been allowed to purchase
supplies for the suppression of the illegal revolt, . . . belligerent rights should have been accorded when
the conflict reached the magnitude and nature of public war waged by two organized regimes ...
foreign states should have kept their hands off while the disturbance took its natural course. A glance
backward over the major civil wars and insurrections of the past century and a quarter will reveal that in
actuality there has been far less of this so-called normal practice than has been commonly supposed.").
106. Id. at 8-9.
107. Vast territorial control, in the case of Spanish Nationalists, was perceived as merely incident to
insurgency status. Id. "The admission of insurgency relieves the government of responsibility for the
political and military acts of the insurgents in the territory under their control, and normally results in
the treating of captured insurgents as prisoners of war rather than as traitors .. . . Admission of
insurgency by foreign states confirms their de facto existence, and to that extent gives them a position
and a personality, albeit anomalous and temporary. It admits that in fact they exercise control over
foreign property and persons within the territorial area subject to their physical control." Id. at 2-4.
108. An interesting exposition of the doctrine states: "The truth is, that.., the normal duty of nonintervention in the internal dissensions of foreign countries dictates neither the one choice nor the other
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present doctrinal arguments to refute orthodox views. Rather, it is to demonstrate
the multiplicity of possible doctrinal positions, if we were to take belligerency law
seriously. Simply by way of example, also relevant to the Colombian situation, is
the differential effects of recognition. Some commentators have attributed quite
different effects to recognition by an incumbent government as opposed to
recognition by a third-party state."°9 In the former case, the government - rather
than losing status - is considered to retain its national sovereignty and to "grant
insurgents merely a sort of legal personality as subject of rights and duties within
the confines of the laws of war.""'
The contrary, it is argued, would allow the
incumbent government too much power to confer upon itself and upon insurgents
the rights of belligerents. Third-party states, the argument goes, must be able to
extend those rights based on their own estimation of their interests. Under this
legal principle, then, the Colombian government could not readily undermine its
sovereignty by merely implying some condition of belligerency. Be that as it may,
this doctrinal snippet is intended merely to suggest the wide range of authority
available under belligerency law.
Beyond the factual and doctrinal play of the concept, Cold War scholars also
criticized belligerency doctrine as an ideological weapon."' The recognition of
insurgency or belligerency, effectively placing the de jure government at a
disadvantage, came to be seen as merely dependent on superpower interests. The
possibility of applying these doctrines neutrally and objectively was dismissed.
Still, scholars of the period did not extrapolate these lessons to other times and
other contexts. Instead of finding fault with the doctrine they found fault with the
context making its neutral application impossible.
The modem-day obsolescence of belligerency rules has been further
demonstrated by critical theorists. In a thorough reworking of the Spanish Civil
War scholarship, Nathaniel Berman examines the supervening legal solution
produced as a consequence of the traditional doctrine's limitations." 2 While
belligerency status is typically identified with neutrality, it can also produce the
[recognition or non-recognition], because each has the practical effect of intervention though not
intended as such, and the foreign state is free, so far as that duty is concerned, to consult its own interest
and the general political good of the world." See McNair, supra note 99, at 482 (citing 1 J. WESTLAKE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2d ed. 1910).
109. The main international effect of an incumbent government recognition of belligerency has
been described as the incumbent government "becomes powerless to criticize the recognition accorded
by a third power." McNair supra note 99, at 475-76(citing CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT, supra note 92, at
Art. (3). Relinquishing the power to criticize is a far cry from the effects that orthodox publicists
attribute to incumbent government recognition, and even to the implicit acknowledgment of
belligerency conditions.
110. Noted in Protocol II, supra note 70; see also CHARLES ZORGBIBE, LA GUERRE CIVILE 4551(1958).

111. See FALK, supra note 93, at 11. "There is almost no reliance in recent diplomatic practice
upon the gradation of civil-war situations implicit in the scale of rebellion, insurgency, and
belligerency. These symbols of legal status have themselves been virtually discarded, and governments
determine their relations to competing political elites on the basis of their preferences, capabilities, and
foreign policy goals, as well as on the basis of what their adversaries are doing or would tolerate."
112. Nathaniel Berman, Between "Alliance" and "Localization": Nationalism and the New
Oscillationism, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 449 (Spring 1994) [hereinafter Berman].
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opposite effect. It provides the springboard for alliances between third-party states
and the parties to the internal conflict. Berman recounts the London NonIntervention Committee's role in patrolling against foreign involvement in the
Spanish conflict. Bypassing belligerency law altogether, a novel non-intervention
arrangement was developed alongside the formal rules.
Traditionally, sovereignty rights would have precluded the international
isolation of Spain's Republican government in the absence of a formal recognition
of belligerency of Franco's forces. Yet, the international Committee upheld the
principle of non-intervention despite not formally recognizing a state of
belligerency. Recognizing belligerency would have, in their estimation, merely
accentuated the divisions in the international community at the time, precipitating
an internationalization of the civil war: that is, rather than evoke neutrality it would
have precipitated alliances with one and the other of Spain's fighting factions. In
this way, the Committee expanded its competence over the conflict without
recourse to belligerency status and had a substantial impact on the course of the
Spanish Civil War. Berman makes the point that belligerency rules did not stand in
the way of international legal action. By contrast, the formal rules in this case, by
precipitating third-party intervention on either side of the conflict after a declaration
of belligerency, would have merely internationalized the conflict then brewing on
Spanish soil.
In current international practice, belligerency doctrine is at most the subject of
historical curiosity or neo-formalist projects." 3 Traditionally, the question of
belligerency is framed in terms of isolating internal conflict, by withdrawing
support to the incumbent government and declaring neutrality as to both sides.
Today, instead of belligerency rules, decisions over international involvement in
internal conflicts are resolved along different axes." 4 Contemporary practice is
framed in terms of adducing whether a sufficient basis exists for direct international
involvement. Rising immediately to the fore are questions of human rights
compliance, political legitimacy, and maintaining international peace. As a result,
fine distinctions over territorial control and the organizational structure of
insurgents would hardly come into play. Colombian publicists who propose to
control the international response to the current conflict by reference to belligerency
rules are, at best, misguided.
113. See, e.g. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, InternationalLaw Governing Aid to Opposition Groups in
Civil War: Resurrecting the Standardsof Belligerency, 63 WASH L. REV. 43, 61 (1988). Gomulkiewicz
acknowledges the bad faith potential of belligerency rules during the Cold War; however, he proposes to
revitalize the rules as a basis for U.S. foreign policy. Under his reformulation, the requirement of
"territorial control" should be strictly adhered to prior to the U.S.'s intervention on the side of
insurgents. Such a rule is, for Gomulkiewicz, a good proxy for legitimacy and representativeness: "The
belligerency standards are a good guide to political legitimacy, however, and could be an important
factor on those occasions when the United States decides to side with the armed opposition against an
old incumbent ally." Id.
114. See David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justificationsfor Military Intervention
in Internal Conflict, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 444 (Spring 1996). "The viability of the traditional rules
governing civil war became increasingly doubtful after World War II. As a practical matter, states
simply disregarded these rules." Id.
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Yet, despite contemporary international practice and Protocol II's own
disclaimers, orthodox internationalism provided the backdrop against ratification.
Its teachings undergirded, and continue to do so, the local understanding of
belligerency rules. Any position or compromise which appears to acknowledge
belligerency-like conditions is thus rejected for fear of down-grading the state's
international status and conversely upgrading the guerrillas'. The main point, here,
is that these arguments have the effect of constraining governmental action. Fear of
international recognition of the guerrillas, a most unlikely event, threatens to derail
the peace process.
As the example of Protocol II demonstrates, agreeing to the instrument's
applicability is equated with recognizing the belligerency status of rebel forces." 5
By reading in this presumption, Colombian publicists raise the bar. It is true that
the guerrillas have not been widely recognized as belligerents by the world
community. Implying that this is the result of orthodox legal rules though would be
inaccurate. The guerrilla's abysmal international projection has more to do with
their own connections to drug-trafficking and kidnapping, and current international
politics, than with belligerency doctrine. This position is not likely to change even
if the Colombian government weaved across the line that local publicists have
drawn. Telling is the fact that Colombia's ratification of Protocol II, ultimately in
1994, did not provoke the much feared international recognition of the guerrillas.
B. Continuing Opposition
Although Protocol II was ultimately adopted, it was and in some quarters still is
vehemently rejected. Some continue to question its applicability." 6 They argue that
Colombia's situation still does not rise to the level of conflict contemplated by the
convention. As such, the argument is made, the Colombian government's
determination to apply it is merely voluntary. "' This position is both adaptive to

115.

See Daniel Garcia-Pefia, El Derecho Internacional Humanitario y La Paz Negociada, in

DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO APLICADO 330 (Tercer Mundo, ed., 1998) [hereinafter

Garcia-Pefia]. "[Tlhe possibility of applying international humanitarian law has been discussed under
the assumption that it would be equivalent to recognizing a status of belligerency for insurgent groups.
During many years this theme was taboo, prohibited; it was only proposed by 'friends of the guerrillas,'
and at the same time it was used by them for propaganda.... Id.
116. See Rafael Nieto Loaiza, Algunas ObservacionesAcerca del Delito Politico y la Aplicaci6n
del DIH en Colombia, in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO APLICADO 371 (Tercer Mundo ed.,
1998) [hereinafter Nieto]. My understanding, from informal sources, is that Mr. Nieto Loaiza has
recently conceded that Colombia now meets Protocol I's factual preconditions. Nonetheless, more
interesting than this acknowledgment is his and others' position until this point; see generally
Sarmiento, supra note 38 (noting the continuing rejection of Protocol I's applicability).
117. Acknowledging the implacable debate over Protocol I's applicability, President Ernesto
Samper's High Commissioner for Peace stated: "[Tihe government, in November 1995, ... deliberately
avoiding an extremely long debate over whether the armed groups satisfied the criteria established
under article I of Protocol II, recognized the necessity that humanitarian law be respected in Colombia
and [we] made a call to the guerrilla groups for them to respect it as well." Garcia-Pefia, supra note
115, at 331.
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the fact of Protocol II's ratification, and it also defends against any belligerency
implication that its application in Colombia may have.
Humanitarian advocates have found themselves struggling against this
position." 8 Voluntary applicability undermines their enforcement efforts. Several
ways around this conundrum have been developed. The first registers the
disagreement over the meaning of Protocol II's scope.'
Proponents of this
position simply insist that the Protocol does apply to all of Colombia's fighting
forces.' ° Representatives of the Colombian Red Cross, for example, argue that the
required threshold is lower than the level of "intensity, duration, territorial control
or extension than that of civil war."''
This however does nothing more than
exacerbate the resistance to Protocol II in some quarters. A lower threshold is
perceived as indirectly lowering the threshold for belligerency status: from an
orthodox perspective this is a route to be rejected at all costs.
A different approach, upholding the application of Protocol II regardless of its
purported scope,"' has been articulated by Colombia's Constitutional Court.'23
That entity has held the provisions of Protocol II to be peremptory international
"
law. 24
' The Court considers them ius cogens norms. 2 ' They are thus fully
118. See Sarmiento, supra note 38, at 273 (noting the anomaly of the government's "political"
decision to abide by Protocol R which leaves open the question of its applicability to the guerrillas,
effectively remitting it to the discretion of each individual subversive organization.).
119. This is the position taken by many human rights advocates both inside and outside Colombia.
Human Rights Watch, for example, dismisses any contrary interpretation: "Protocol II is applicable
when ... all of which Colombia clearly satisfies." WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 20, at 26; "In
interviews with Human Rights Watch, all groups engaged in the conflict said they support some form of
enforcement of minimum humanitarian standards." Id. at 24; "While some disagreement may be the
subject of honest debate, much of the opposition to the full compliance with laws of war in Colombia is
a cynical justification for continued, deliberate, and atrocious violations of the minimum standards
necessary to protect human life." Id. at 2. This Article, rather than merely dismiss them, specifically
addresses the interpretations of the laws of war prevalent in Colombia, which turn out to have more than
just bad faith behind them.
120. For an example of this argument, see generally Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 74. CarrilloSuarez argues that Protocol U's having come to be seen in Colombia as applying only to civil wars is the
product of "inappropriate interpretation" and the "distracting discourse of 'civil war."' My objective in
this section is to demonstrate that this restrictive interpretation of Protocol II is not merely a haphazard
error. Rather it responds to the political motives of mainstream Colombian publicists, and it can be
identified as part of a larger program which makes use of an idiosyncratic interpretation of international
law.
121.
Brief to the Constitutional Court supporting the constitutionality of Protocol II following its
approval by Colombia's Congress, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-225/95, at 393
[hereinafter CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-225/95]; see also International Committee for
the Red Cross, Special Report: The Role of a Neutral Intermediary in Colombia (1998).
122. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 74, at 37-38.
123.
See CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-225/95, supranote 121, at 393.
124. This approach owes much to Magistrate Ciro Angarita Baron who wrote the earlier opinion on
the constitutionality of Protocol I, in 1993. See CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-574/92.
Prior even to the introduction of Protocol 11 for approval by Colombia's Congress, Angarita announced
the ius cogens quality of international humanitarian law. As such, Protocol II need not be formally
incorporated in the national legal order. Instead, it is supreme law.
125.
Notably orthodox internationalists have rejected the Constitutional Court's opinion that
Protocol 1I constitutes imperative international law. Instead, they assert that only common Article 3
enjoys that status, pursuant to the International Court of Justice's decision on the Nicaragua case, June
27, 1986. See Nieto, supra note 116, at 362: "[this] only demonstrates . . . the profound lack of
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applicable in Colombia by operation of the 1991 Constitution's incorporation of
international humanitarian norms as supreme law. 26 No material conditions to its
application are thus binding.' The Court goes on to say that Protocol II norms are
applicable even in the context of public riots and civil disturbances, which are
otherwise excluded within the Protocol's very text. Nonetheless, the Court upholds
its applicability on the basis of a mix of constitutional and international law: ius
cogens humanitarian law, just like core human28 rights law, is binding under any
circumstance under the Colombian constitution.'
Indeed, orthodox
This holding has not been widely accepted.' 29
internationalists question its legal validity. They insist that Protocol II is not ius
cogens. As a result, it would not be directly applicable to the Colombian situation
without regard to its textual preconditions.
Outside Colombia, commentators have acknowledged that common Article 3
fits within the category of peremptory law. Its extension to Protocol II is not
clear. 3
Still, the Court's holding is a plausible position, at a minimum not
It is a position, not unlike orthodox-type
excluded by international opinion.'
knowledge of the Court not only in terms of the legal character of international humanitarian law of
non-international armed conflicts, but, also more gravely, of the nature even of imperative law as well
as customary law."
126. CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA 1991, art. 214.
127. See RODRIGO UPRIMNY, Sentido y aplicabilidaddel derecho internacional humanitario en
Colombia, in Conflicto Armado y Derecho Humanitario (1994), for a discussion and support of the
Court's decision. Uprimny argues that since these norms of international humanitarian law are ius
cogens and thus not subject to factual preconditions to their applicability, then by extension the
substantive norms of Protocol I (applicable to wars of national liberation) are also applicable to the
Colombian conflict. See id. at 172.
128. CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-225/95, supra note 121, at 393 (stating that the
formal adoption of Protocol HImerely functioned to give effect to the constitutional norm, to incorporate
the Protocol within national legislation, and to notify the international community that Colombia
committed itself to respecting and enforcing respect of these norms).
129. The International Court of Justice has assented to the jus cogens character of common Article
3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Military and ParamilitaryActivities, (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, (June 27). The Court has not expressly held that Protocol II enjoys the same rank. However,
it leaves the door open for such argument: "[A] great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and 'elementary considerations of
humanity' ... these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified
the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law." (1986 I.C.J. 226).
130. For an argument in support of Protocol I's inderogability, see William Walker, The
InternationalLaw Applicable to Guerrilla Movements in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Case Study of
Contra Attacks on NicaraguanFarming Cooperatives, 21N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Pol. 147, 151 (1988);
see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law:
Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 217 [hereinafter
Bassiouni]: "Among the international crimes that fall within this category [jus cogens] are: aggression,
genocide, 'crimes against humanity', war crimes, slavery and slave-related practices, torture and piracy.
In time, other international crimes may rise to that level and be deemed jus cogens crimes."
131. See Bassiouni, supra note 130, at 220 ("The 'Law of Geneva' (four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and portions of Protocols I and II which embody customary law) are deemed to have risen to the
level of a general custom."); cf Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof Internal Atrocities,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995) Meron finds that Protocol 11has "not yet been universally recognized as
part of customary international law," however its inclusion within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Rwandan war crimes tribunal is a big step in that direction. He argues in favor of individual criminal
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arguments, to the question of international humanitarian law's applicability. It is
simply a different answer than the one given by orthodox publicists.
In any case, arguments in favor of Protocol II have not dislodged reflexive,
The orthodox notion of belligerency has not been
orthodox assumptions.'
displaced. It remains a strong international law argument, marshaled to prevent
significant compromises against the state.
For Pastrana's government, the result has been, instead of reinforcing his
position, to limit his range of action. Working under strict belligerency constraints,
the government has to present itself as retaining complete territorial control. And, it
has to claim the safeguard of its population and enforcement of its laws. Its actual
incapacity to perform these flnctions places it in a vulnerable position. Reasonable
options, such as Protocol II or other situations described in this Article, are rejected
by Colombia's legal intelligentsia who argue they would contribute to the
guerrilla's belligerency claims. Their arguments carry considerable weight. They
claim to represent unquestioned and unquestionable international law. Under the
all-or-nothing view of orthodox law, the stakes are then raised. Options equated
with belligerency status are in most instances taken off the table. Their acceptance
would entail nothing short of relinquishing state sovereignty on the international
plane.
As a result, the heightened definition of belligerency is left to reinforce the
logic of war. Either the government asserts complete control or the guerrillas
achieve virtual statehood. Conversely, either the guerrillas acquire permanent
control or the government monopolizes the terms of peace and war. In this way, the
stalemate on the military field is merely replicated by legal discourse.' Outwardly,
the standard of belligerency promises to keep the guerrillas at bay. More
ominously, it straitjackets the government into intensifying, rather than humanizing,
the war.
C. The De-MilitarizedZone
A separate example of international legal argument in Colombia relates to the
establishment of a de-militarized zone in which to conduct peace talks. To initiate
the process, Pastrana declared the demilitarization of a part of southeastern
Colombia. The area consists of 42,000 square kilometers and covers five
municipalities. A demilitarized zone has been a long-standing FARC demand as a
condition for negotiations. Ostensibly, the area is intended to provide a safe zone
for conducting peace talks. Pastrana's concession was a bold move not lacking in
critics.
responsibility and universal jurisdiction to prosecute violations of common Article 3 and Protocol H.
See id.
132. For an example of the argument limited to insisting on the applicability of international
humanitarian law in Colombia, see Carillo-Suarez, supra note 74.
133. See Jorge L. Esquirol, El Proceso de Paz: Conforme al Derecho Internacional, in LA OTRA
GUERRA: EL DERECHO COMO CONTINUACION DEL CONFLICTO Y LENGUAJE DE LA PAZ 95 (Oscar

Eduardo Guardiola Rivera et al. eds., 1999).
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The U.S. reaction actually beat local antagonists to the punch. The demilitarized zone was interpreted as a safe haven for drug-traffickers. Considering
the FARC's well-established association with the drug trade, granting this
organization free reign over a sizable portion of Colombia was incomprehensible to
many U.S. observers. Within Colombia, the reaction presented U.S. interests as at
odds with the peace process.
However, U.S. skeptics did not constitute the greatest challenge to Pastrana's
leadership. Instead, a crucial part of his proposal consisted of managing the
government's credibility and continued sovereignty over the region.
Not
surprisingly, the local authorities and populace in the area were alarmed about the
meaning of the action. More broadly, Pastrana's concession of a huge tract of land
to his opponents appeared to be a renunciation of the zeal with which previous
governments had defended the state's sovereignty and guarded against
acknowledging a state of belligerency.
Pastrana was forced to enact a critical maneuver. It was clear that the specter
of belligerency was at loggerheads with peace negotiations. The guerrillas'
condition of a safe zone - clearly with a strategic eye toward their own
belligerency arguments - created a standstill. The government was, thus, forced to
reformulate the conceptual bases for the concession. Rather than acquiesce in the
meaning of demilitarization as relinquishment of control, territorial control was reconceived as a procedural mechanism. Under a law adopted by Congress in 1997
enabling the president to take measures in furtherance of the peace process,
Pastrana withdrew the military while retaining "control" over the zone.'34 Thus,
instead of conceding a territorial claim or even acquiescing to a safe zone - which
could be then used by the guerrillas to argue for belligerency - the action was
redefined as procedural, strictly related to the peace process, therefore offering no
substantive basis for belligerency rights. Withdrawing troops from the zone
voluntarily, in furtherance of the President's peace powers under the statute,
reinforces the state's lawful authority over the territory.
This maneuver bespeaks the pragmatism of Colombian policy makers. In this
same way, Pastrana has injected a great deal of realism in his peace making.
However, this is not to say that the formal notions of belligerency do not play a
strong role and may even play a defeating role. Notably, international law experts
have not supported his action by, for example, distinguishing between the
government's concession and the requisites for belligerency or even sovereignty.
Clearly, occupation of land alone is not the contemporary standard for recognizing
sovereignty. Protection of human rights and guarantees for political rights are
common incidents to international recognition. Thus, rather than constituting the
sine qua non for international recognition, Pastrana's actions are not likely to propel
134. Ley 418, Art. 8, Dec. 26, 1997 (Specifically, Chapter I, Article 8, Paragraph 1: "The
Government can agree... with the armed organizations outside the law.., to their temporary quartering
or that of their members in precise and determinate zones within the national territory. In such zones,
arrest warrants will be suspended against those with warrants outstanding until the Government so
determines or declares that such process has concluded.").
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Still, orthodox
the international community's endorsement of the FARC.
commentators have declined to make room for these actions in terms of
international law.
As a result, the implementation of a demilitarized zone has come at great
political cost. Indeed, tension over the area led to the resignation of a highly
popular minister of defense and along with him the resignation of five of the
nation's top military commanders. The country has never been so close to a
military revolt since the 1950's. The action came uncomfortably close to outright
rejection of Pastrana's leadership. The concession greatly undermined confidence
in the direction of the peace process."'
Military leaders especially objected to the zone. Initially granted for a period of
six months to end February 1999, the time frame for peace negotiations has been
repeatedly extended and delayed. At this point, there is no firm deadline to reincorporate the territory. As a result, military operations have been made more
difficult. From the perspective of the internal war, the guerrillas have used the zone
to stage attacks and stockpile weapons and home-made gas bombs. Furthermore,
the FARC has been insisting on assuming more governmental functions. While the
government continues to assert its jurisdiction and authority over the area, criticism
1 36
has not been muted.
Adding to the internal skepticism, the position of conservative U.S. lawmakers
fuels dissent. In relation to U.S. funding of Pastrana's "Plan Colombia," some of
the potential conditions surfacing from Congressional hearings is the abolishment of
the demilitarized zone. Even after meeting with President Pastrana, Rep. Benjamin
Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, has maintained
that: "Support for increased military aid to Colombia should be dependent on the
restoration of government access to the narco-guerrillas' 16,000-square-mile zone
of impunity."'' 37 From the U.S. perspective, the zone has effectively been the site of
rampant drug trafficking activity. As a result, more conservative Congressmen are
calling for the dismantling of the zone as a condition for U.S. assistance.
With appropriations not yet firm, it is unclear as of this writing whether or not
the U.S. will insist on this condition. When the zone was implemented, State
Department officials ultimately decided to support Pastrana after obtaining
assurances that the area would not become a drug zone. This time with the carrot of
financial assistance and the play of Congressional politics, it is not clear if the U.S.
will attempt to micro-manage the de-militarized zone.

135. A Gallup Poll of the country's business leaders demonstrates that: 56.6% are opposed to the
concession of a demilitarized zone and 56.2% give Pastrana's peace strategy failing marks. Paz si, pero
sin Victor G. y sin canje, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), Oct. 24, 1999.
136. See, e.g., General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, Realidadde la zona de despeje, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti,
Colom.) July 30, 1999. The General outlines the FARC's assumption of governmental powers. He also
decries the zone's use as a drug sanctuary sheltering the cultivation and processing of coca.
137. John Diamond, Capital Hill Divided Over Colombian Aid Appeal, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept.
23, 1999.
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D. "Restricted" Belligerency
A recent proposal by one of Colombia's most respected ex-presidents, Alfonso
L6pez Michelsen, sparked a fiery replay of the belligerency debate.'38 Specifically,
L6pez Michelsen advanced the feasibility of recognizing belligerency status for the
guerrillas in order to facilitate an exchange of captured combatants.'39
How can we exchange inmates ofjustice, indictedfor crimes under the
Penal Code,for soldiers in the service of the Republic,fallen as prisoners
in actions of war? And how can we call such retentions (of soldiers)
kidnappingswhen the characterof a kidnappingis the element of surprise
on a defenseless citizen? . . . The obvious conclusion is that to put in

practice the healthy objectives inspired by the representatives of civil
society and the political class, the most adequate procedure is to
recognize a restrictedbelligerency."'
The piece was highly polemical and generated a broad range of published responses
from different sectors of Colombian society. 4 ' Defenders 42 but mostly opponents
laid out their arguments on the topic. The controversy was documented in several
weeks of national press coverage.
L6pez Michelsen proposed that the government recognize restricted
belligerency status for the guerrillas. His claim was that this international status
would facilitate two government objectives: humanizing the internal war and
138.

Alfonso L6pez Michelsen, Para legitimar el canje Beligerancia Restringida, EL TIEMPO

(BogotA, Colom.), Oct. 10, 1999 [hereinafter L6pez].
139. Citing unnamed international experts, one of Colombia's largest weeklies, Semana, reported
that the major danger from an exchange of captured combatants lies, not in military considerations or
impunity concerns, but rather with the resulting recognition of the guerrillas' belligerency status. El
golazo del canje, SEMANA (Bogot, Colom.), Jan. 18, 1999 [hereinafter El golazo]. Reciting
Colombia's brand of orthodox international law, the magazine cited three forms of belligerency
recognition: by third party states, multilateral organizations, and explicitly or implicitly by the
incumbent government. An exchange of combatants, it went on, would constitute recognition which
"the Pastrana administration knows it must protect itself to the maximum in this matter because a false
step could represent not a a peaceful solution to the conflict but the beginning of the territorial division
of Colombia." Id, An implicit recognition by Pastrana would produce the "obligation on the part of the
international community to abide by and recognize the belligerency status of the armed group." Id. In
other words, according to the article, the peace process itself may constitute an implicit recognition of
belligerency. If the conflict is not resolved, the gamble would leave in its place "territorial division with
two armies with similarly internationally-recognized legitimacy." Id. Semana's reporting of orthodox
views, as unquestionable international law, contributes to the stranglehold of the former, threatening the
viability of negotiations.
140. L6pez, supra note 138.
141.

L6pez plantea beligerenciaparaFarc,EL TIEMPO (Bogot, Colom.), Oct. 10, 1999.

142. Pointing to the underlying issue of civilian kidnappings, Colombia's major daily El Tiempo's
peace bureau supported the idea of creating a new status of "humanitarian belligerency." The piece
advanced the notion that such status would have no bearing on any actual international recognition of
the guerrilla forces. Indeed, international recognition, it was asserted, is unlikely due to the guerrillas'
drug links and violations of civil liberties. See La realidad virtual de la beligerencia, EL TIEMPO

(Bogot, Colom.), Oct. 18, 1999.
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facilitating a prisoner exchange with the guerrillas. These two issues are high on the
government's agenda. Humanizing the war has been proposed in the context of ad
hoc agreements either in tandem to the peace negotiations or as part of the peace
agenda itself. While the guerrillas, in principle, agree to be bound by the laws of
war, there are no effective enforcement mechanisms.' 43 In addition, the rebels insist
that their internal codes take precedence over inconsistent international rules.
Prisoner exchanges stem from the demands of the guerrillas and family members of
soldiers. The government is contemplating a response as part of the peace process.
Formal legislation, in order to effectuate the process, is currently pending in the
Colombian Congress." One principal obstacle is the legal basis for the release of
convicted criminals, as opposed to prisoners of war.
In any case, the ex-president reasoned that by conceding this long sought after
status to the guerrillas, the latter may be better held to international humanitarian
rules and a legal basis would be established for prisoner exchanges. L6pez
Michelsen hoped to offer status in exchange for a commitment to the laws of war.
Not surprisingly, the proposal was greeted with alarm by orthodox internationalists
and government spokespersons alike.
The proposal was soundly pronounced legally infirm. One of Colombia's
premier publicists stated in response to L6pez Michelsen's proposal:
There is no state of restricted belligerencyforeseen in InternationalLaw.
If the Colombian state grants the rebels the status of belligerency, it
converts them into subjects of internationallaw with all the rights and
responsibilities attending this quality. Furthermore, it would not be
possible to impede other Statesfrom recognizing the state of belligerency
which would formalize civil war. Finally, the peace process does not
require a declaration of belligerency which, as has been seen, does not
follow as the requirements of InternationalLaw are not met. 4 '
First, the existence of a restricted belligerency status was dismissed.
Mainstream experts insisted that either a belligerency exists or it does not: but
nothing in between.' 46 Another of the country's international law authorities
expounded his position in the national press:
143. See RANGEL, supra note 18, at 95-103. Noted expert on the Colombian conflict, Rangel
supports a recognition of belligerency with the goal of international humanitarian law compliance on
the part of the guerrillas. Rangel reasons that complying with international law is tremendously costly to
the guerrillas in terms of reducing their revenues, possibly as much as half. By contrast, the
government's costs in granting belligerency, conditioning it on humanitarian compliance of course, is
comparatively costless. Few nations, if any, would follow suit as a result of to the guerrillas' drug ties
and ideological unpopularity. See id.
144. General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, La Ley del 'canje', ELTIEMpO (Bogod, Colom.), Oct. 8, 1999
[hereinafter Tovar].
145. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Reflexiones sobre el estado de beligerancia, in AMBITO
JURiDICO, (Year 2, No. 44, Oct. 25 to Nov. 7, 1999) (hereinafter Cabra).
146. The Government's official response re-iterated the position of orthodox publicists. The High
Commissioner for Peace stated: "restricted belligerency does not coincide with internal or international
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Some academics have affirmed that the figure of belligerency is "out of
fashion" and its discussion, useless and unconducive. Maybe this is so in
relation to other internal conflicts of the many geographically, but the
facts show the contrary in relationto the Colombian (case). 47
'
As a result, it is argued, belligerency doctrine is relevant, and a contextual
definition of it is simply erroneous. Here is a clear instance of the idiosyncratic
handling of international law in Colombia. The concepts are depicted as monolithic
and impervious to specific situations. Needless to say, this is quite a peculiar theory
of international law's development.
The granting of status as a bargaining chip is not novel, even in the Colombian
context. A type of status for the guerrillas is already in place. The government has
recognized the rebels as "political actors" as a prelude to peace talks. Within
Colombia's national laws, it would have been inconsistent to negotiate with a
criminal group. As a result, the enabling law, Law 418 of 1997, granting the
executive the power to negotiate with armed insurgents also provides for the
recognition of "political" status. It is handled in an openly contingent way. When
the ELN staged several mass kidnappings in early 1999, the government withdrew
their "political" status. In addition, the concept is significant for the paramilitaries
as well: it offers them the potential of participating in peace negotiations. Because
of their gross humanitarian violations, the government has refused to recognize
them, which is also the position of the left-wing guerrillas. In any case, although not
linked to any traditional belligerency right, status is significant to irregular forces
wishing to be recognized as interlocutors.
This way of proceeding also has a precedent in the case of third-party state
negotiations with the guerrillas. It is the route that the Venezuelan government has
taken. Venezuelan agro-businessmen are routinely kidnapped, taken across the
border, and ransomed by the guerrillas. Attempting to halt these activities,
Venezuelan diplomats have recognized a state of "political belligerency" in
Colombia in order to make contact with guerrilla forces. The status accorded does
not extend any right which may be attributed to the legal version of the concept. It
is simply limited to the issue of Venezuelan security. The ensuing negotiations
have, at least officially, alleviated this problem.
What the Colombian and Venezuelan solutions demonstrate, at a minimum, is
an alternative to the monolithic concept of status. Disaggregating status has created
norms. In the internal plane, no basis or legal support exists; in the international order, there is no
precedent nor has it been framed in international instruments." El Memorando de Victor G. Ricardo,
EL TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), Oct. 13, 1999.
147. See Rafael Nieto Loaiza, Los Argumentos de L6pez Estdn Equivocados, EL TIEMPO (BogotA,
Colom.), Oct. 12, 1999 [hereinafter Loaiza]. (Text continues: "The FARC have expressly requested this
status, columnists discuss it, the High Commissioner for Peace issues a communique in which he
sustains that no action by the government has the intention or significance of conceding belligerency
status, and to remove any further doubt, President ChAvez [of Venezuela] and his chancellor, in relation
to his polemical declaration of neutrality, has affirmed that it is not Venezuela but the Colombian
Government that has conceded it. Unfortunately, this figure is for Colombia and its context more alive
than ever. And the risks are very great.")
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room to negotiate against kidnapping and to engage in peace negotiations.
However, taking the route of a political solution, while it does sidestep the legal
orthodoxy, does not do the work of transforming or transcending it. Orthodox
positions remain intact. And, the political solution in question is constantly at risk
of transgressing the lines set by orthodox authorities. Government action thus does
not escape the law: on the contrary, it merely replays the typical dichotomy between
law and politics. The result is that law retains the high ground, potentially
inhibiting certain actions and undermining the legitimacy of others which are
contrary to its dictates. In the Colombian case, an anachronous law of belligerency
is used to constrain a wide array of negotiation.
A second objection to L6pez Michelsen was based on the impact it would have
on international humanitarian law. Conditioning respect for the laws of war on the
granting of belligerency status was thoroughly rejected as inconsistent with
international law. The laws of war are held to be binding irrespective of status. 4 '
Furthermore, orthodox adherents affirmed that respect for the law is a pre-condition
to the recognition of belligerency status and not the other way around.
Insistence on the hierarchy of norms is a commonplace within most legal
analysis. However, insisting on this order of affairs in the face of non-compliance
refuses to engage in the problem of enforcement. Although it may well serve one's
ideology or the programmatic imperatives of a political program, it obfuscates
rather than helps to clarify the issue. In other words, arguing over which comes first
belligerency or the rules of war does not begin to address the question of what
incentives can be set to induce compliance with humanitarian norms. Ideally, all
guerrilla groups would have internalized the laws of war, and there would be no
need to argue for its primacy. However, since such is not the case, merely reiterating the hierarchy, while morally satisfying, does not stand much of a chance of
being effective. In fact, one of the aims behind the development of belligerency
notions was precisely securing compliance with the laws of war by rebel forces. In
this same way, an effective mechanism may be the recognition of some type of
status and international oversight.
In the main, the arguments described above demonstrate the stranglehold of
orthodox internationalism on debates over the peace process. Only a minority of
voices have interjected to endorse a different version of international law.'49 Some
critical commentators have decried the phantasmagoric or taboo quality that the
concept of belligerency has taken within Colombian discourse. Belligerency status,
it was pointed out, has no real bearing on Colombia's international position. Thirdparty states are not motivated by the decision of the Colombian government to grant

148. See, e.g., Cabra, supra note 145 (arguing against belligerency on the basis of the FARC's
failure to meet the formal requirement of "territorial control" since the demilitarized zone is based on a
government grant; and on the basis of the FARC's failure to comply with international humanitarian
law).
149. See Lpez PlanteaBeligeranciapara FARC, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Oct. 11, 1999; see
also Alfredo Rangel Suarez, Por Que el Miedo ?, EL TIEMPO (Bogota, Colom.), Oct. 15, 1999.
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or withhold formal legal status to the guerrillas."5 ° Furthermore, the Colombian
guerrillas' terrorist and drug ties effectively rule out any blanket international
recognition. Therefore, recognizing its negligible practical effect, the concept is
unjustifiably significant. In other words, there is no reason to fear it.
Orthodox internationalists have retorted by rejecting head-on the purported
obsolescence of belligerency doctrine, at least in Colombia.'51
Indeed,
internationalists reinforce the significance of the concept. However it is not so
much out of fear of international reaction as out of fear of internal reaction. 52
Tellingly, they are prepared to defend the concept's applicability in Colombia even
while recognizing its demise internationally. In this way, belligerency doctrine is
given new life but a very peculiar one at that.
It may be acknowledged that the international impact of recognizing a
belligerency situation - especially a limited one - would be small to nothing. Yet,
it is argued that outright recognition would provide the springboard for ever
increasing demands by the rebels. By way of example, the demilitarized zone could
be claimed as occupied territory and the claim to organized government would
become harder to resist. While these demands may indeed be forthcoming, they
could well arise with or without the recognition of some belligerency status. Quite
transparently, the importance of the belligerency question lies in the internal politics
it demarcates.
Specifically, the issue which belligerency holds at bay in the context of this
recent exchange concerns prisoner exchanges.
Understandably, exchanging
guerrillas for regular soldiers in the hands of the insurgents, although politically
popular, is militarily problematic. It entails the release of jailed rebels who will no
doubt return to guerrilla ranks. Top military commanders have questioned outright
the wisdom of this exchange.'" Resisting its implementation on the basis of
international law concepts, however, is not helpful.
It places a purported
150. The third-party state which has the greatest incentive to recognize the Colombian guerrillas'
belligerency status is Venezuela. Venezuelan nationals have been routinely kidnapped and extorted by
the guerrilla forces. Border incursions are not uncommon. The Venezuelan government would thus be
in a position to take advantage of one of the main incidents of recognizing belligerency: the protection
of its nationals. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 238. Additionally, President Hugo Chdvez's
"Bolivarian" government has in the past expressed sympathy toward Colombia's insurgents.
Nonetheless, the Venezuelan chancellory has announced that it distinguishes "political" belligerency
from legal belligerency. It recognizes the former in the case of the guerrillas exclusively for the purpose
of halting cross-border incursions. This distinction is not unlike the Colombian government's own
differentiation between political standing, for the purpose of initiating peace talks, and belligerency
status. Still, it should be noted that notwithstanding Venezuela's reluctance to recognize other
belligerency rights, ChAvez speaks in terms of Venezuelan neutrality vis a vis the actors to the
Colombian conflict. See Presidente Chdvez Reitera Neutralidad,EL TIEMPO (Bogoi, Colom.), Sept.
12, 1999. Separately, the Venezuelan government has also made overtures to hosting the peace talks
with the ELN in Venezuelan territory. See Maria Cristancho, Chdvez Estudia Convenci6n del ELN en
Venezuela, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Oct. 9, 1999.
151. See generally Loaiza, supra note 147.
152. See Vicente R. Torrijos, El Todo por el Todo, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Oct. 12, 1999.
("In a synthesis, it would suppose a much more complex negotiation than the one now ... that would
directly target the redistribution of political and economic power in Colombia.")
153. See generally Tovar, supra note 143.
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authoritative interpretation of law over and above the actual concerns with the
policy and the actual range of alternatives.
In this way, international law concepts are inscribed with the political choices
of orthodox internationalists. Of course, any legal argument is inherently linked to
some political position. However, the difference in Colombia is that only one legal
argument is held to be valid law. And that law is defined by publicists reluctant to
political compromise.
IV. REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF WAR
A The Mainz Agreement
During July 12-15, 1998, a promising initiative for peace was spearheaded by
members of civil society." Under the auspices of the Catholic Church, the ELN
met in Mainz, Germany with prominent members of Colombia's political class in
their capacity as private citizens. The government was not officially represented.
After more than three decades of civil conflict, this initiative was perceived as the
people of Colombia taking matters into their own hands. While government
representatives were present, they participated in their personal and not official
capacities. Thus, the government did not formally participate in this early initiative
with the ELN.
Participants included an eclectic mix of politicians, judges and representatives
of non-government organizations (NGO's). Over the course of three days, the
participants met in closed session. Upon concluding, two important
accomplishments emerged. The first was an international humanitarian agreement.
The second was a commitment and a schedule for peace negotiations.
A follow-up meeting, to which the government was ultimately invited, was to
set the timetable and the framework for broad-based peace negotiations. While
retaining the possibility of a different structure, the most discussed scenario was a
constitutional assembly. The model would be the 1991 Constituent Assembly that
the country had witnessed not long ago. A new assembly would attempt to be even
more representative and of course include representatives of the guerrilla groups
who had not been present at the earlier convention.
Attracting immediate attention were the agreements providing for the
humanization of the war. Several important concessions were obtained from the

154. An objection to civil society initiatives often heard within Colombia is that this device is
frequently manipulated by the country's main political forces. "Whose civil society?" is often
rhetorically asked to designate the beholdenness of civil society groupings to particular actors in the
internal conflict. In any case, the Mainz grouping of civil society, while clearly pro-peace identified
individuals, hailed from various sectors. If any particular allegiance can be outwardly surmised, it
would be to the Colombian state. Many participants were actually public officials acting in their
personal capacities.
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ELN.
Among the most salient, the rebels committed to restrict their kidnapping
activities. Kidnapping is widely practiced by Colombia's rebel groups as both a
mode of pressuring the government'1 6 and a method of financing their activities.
Indeed, most of the kidnappings across the country have the ultimate goal of
extorting large ransoms from family members. While the guerrillas target wealthy
individuals, many kidnappings end in tragedy when it is discovered that families are
unable to pay. The Mainz Agreement provided that the ELN would cease
financially-motivated kidnappings of minors, the elderly,'57 and pregnant women.
Men and non-pregnant women would continue to be subject to retention until other
financing methods could be achieved.
Other key provisions of the Agreement included a series of restraints on
military targets. The guerrillas would henceforth not attack any civilian or medical
installation plainly marked with the symbol of the International Red Cross.
Indigenous territories were to be treated as neutral and outside the conflict. 5 In
addition, the ELN agreed to cease its sabotage operations of the country's oil
pipelines until the national convention that was also planned during the Mainz
meetings. 59
'
The Mainz Agreement met with enthusiastic popular support."& It signaled a
scaling down of the war. The government's immediate reaction was at first highly
supportive. 6' Official support soon began to unravel. The Minister of Defense
rejected the validity of the accord and challenged its legality. His sharp criticism
raised doubts as to the Pastrana administration's objectives. Quickly thereafter, a
155. Since at least 1995, the ELN has declared itself subject to International Humanitarian Law.
Specifically, the group has agreed to comply with Protocol II and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949. Still, the interpretation of these treaties was questioned by the ELN, specifically as to the
meaning of "hostages," "non-combatants" and key terms of that sort. See Commandant Manuel Perez,
Public Declaration(July 15, 1995).
156. For example, the ELN's kidnapping of a church congregation during Sunday services was
meant to pressure the government into granting them a demilitarized zone to begin negotiations. Peace
talks with the ELN have been stalled during 1999 as a result of the ELN's insistence that they be
accorded the same terms as the FARC, i.e. a demilitarized territory within Colombia's borders in which
to proceed with negotiations. The governments has thus far refused this demand.
157. Defined in the Mainz Agreement as persons 65 years of age or over.
158. Indigenous populations caught in the cross-fire is one of the high casualties of the internal
conflict. In 1998, the Embera Katio population of the province of Cordoba appealed to the international
community for assistance. See http://www.colombiasupport.net/chapters/chicago/texts/orewa.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2000). Their tribal territory was the site of intensive fighting between the guerrillas and
paramilitaries.
159. Exploding
oil
pipelines
is
the
signature
of
ELN
attacks.
See
http://www.colombiasupport.net/chapters/chicago/texts/orewa.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2000).
160. See Ni tan cerca, ni tan lejos, SEMANA (BogotA, Colom.), July 18, 1998, at 7 34-38. Even the
right-wing paramilitaries, the ELN's declared mortal enemies, celebrated the announcements within the
Mainz agreement, although considering its entirety to constitute a declaration of war. See Acuerdo de
Mainz es Una Declaraci6nde Guerra, EL NUEVO SIGLO, July 18, 1998, at 7.
161. President Ernesto Samper, still in office, supported the agreement describing it as "legitimate."
See Samper Aval6 Acuerdos de Maguncia, EL COLOMBIANO (BogotA, Colom.), July 24, 1998.
President-elect Andrds Pastrana also indicated his support. See PastranaAcoge Pacto de Puertas del
Cielo, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), July 17, 1998. ("It is really a very important step and the new
government supports it decisively .. ");see also, Carlos V. De Roux, Alcances Humanitarios del
Acuedo de Mainz, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), July 19, 1998.
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chorus of legal arguments joined in pronouncing the agreement a dead letter. In a
detailed commentary, noted publicist Ernesto Borda Medina did not mince words:
The problem arises when there exists and there is an intention to promote
the application of a "heterodox" International Humanitarian Law,
improvised to the rhythm of the moment in the conflict, attempting to base
such argument on the particularities of the Colombian case. This
constitutes not only a grave legal error, but also apoliticalmiscalculation
with terrible consequences, as the attempt to relativize its precepts ends in
liquidating its universal value and its importance as the common
language upon which to demand its enforcement. "Heterodox"
InternationalHumanitarianLaw simply and flatly does not exist... (my
underline)".162
The accord was rejected on two grounds. First, it was argued that the state was
not a party and thus the agreement could not qualify as a humanitarian agreement
under common Article 3. Second, it was argued that the commitments obtained fell
below the minimum standards already required by international humanitarian law.
The first type of objection refused to recognize the agency of the
representatives of civil society. This view held firmly to the position that only
states have the authority to enter into humanitarian negotiations with rebel forces. It
is a formal reading of common Article 3 which ignores current international
practice. Non-governmental organizations and representatives of civil society have
been intensively involved in initiating and crafting international instruments.
Indeed, they have been so much as recognized as subjects of international law in a
number of contexts. Nonetheless, the mainstream interpretation adhered to the
formal conception of the subjects of international law.
The second type of objection addressed the document's illegality as a matter of
humanitarian law. Its provisions were deemed to fall below the minimum
international requirements. The claim of Rafael Nieto Loaiza captures orthodox
objections:
Much in spite of the affirmations of some of the participants (to the
agreement)in the sense that what was signed in Mainz is a "humanitarian
accord a la Colombian," from the start it should be noted that said
document cannot be considered a humanitarian accord and that, ifit
were, it would be null by full rights, because it is contrary to the
fundamental principles of (InternationalHumanitarianLaw) and the basic

162. See Ernesto Borda Medina, Comentarios Sobre los Aspectos Humanitariosdel "Acuerdo de
Puerta del Cielo. " in Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz, la Vida y ia Libertad (Ed.), Conversaciones de
paz frente al horror: Acuerdos Humanitarios 102-122 (1998) (emphasis added).
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content of Article3 3 common, the referenced rule of imperative
16
internationallaw.
Objections were directed to the acknowledgment and codification of lower
standards for the Colombian conflict than those generally applicable under
international law. For example, critics rejected the commitment to reduce
kidnappings. Kidnapping was equated with hostage-taking which is prohibited
under international humanitarian law. As a result, agreeing to the limits on
kidnapping, it was argued, implicitly condoned the hostage-taking of others. In this
way, this provision was found in dereliction of international obligations.164
In the same way, the commitment against attacking civilian installations was
challenged. The Mainz Agreement provided that civilian sites marked as such
would not be the target of guerrilla attacks. Mainstream publicists decried the
agreement as a subversion of the requirements of the laws of war. The international
norm, it was argued, is that all civilian installations are protected and that only
military targets are subject to attack. The Mainz Agreement would invert that order
by allowing for attacks on all installations not marked as civilian.
Also the proposed neutrality of indigenous communities was challenged. The
orthodox position was that, in the context of an insurgency, the civilian population
is never neutral. That is, only the recognition of belligerency allows third parties to
assume a position of neutrality vis a vis the government and guerrillas. Since no
belligerency is recognized, the civilian population - indigenous territories
included - remains subject to the laws of the state and thus cannot be neutral.
Strikingly, no legal arguments of similar weight were broadly disseminated in
support of the Mainz Agreement's validity. Instead, it was defended on political
grounds. The Agreement was deemed a necessary first step toward a peace process.
If anything, the document was described as embodying Colombian exceptionalism
to international legality. Orthodox publicists denounced its creole, particularly
Colombian and non-legal character.
Interestingly, both the FARC and the paramilitary groups have advanced
precisely such a particularist approach to international humanitarian rules. Citing
the uniqueness of the Colombian conflict, these parties propose a set of ground
rules tailored to their actual conditions. These have been described in terms of a
creole or particular version of international humanitarian law. Specifically, the

163. Rafael Nieto Loaiza, El Acuerdo de Maguncia a la luz del Derecho Internacional
Humanitario(1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
164. Clearly, kidnapping is widley perceived as falling under proscriptions on hostage-taking under

international humanitarian law. See INTERNATIONAL

COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARIES
ON PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE

PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I1), (1977) "It should
be noted that hostages are persons who are in the power of a party to the conflict or its agent, willingly
or unwillingly, and who answer with their freedom, their physical integrity or their life for the execution
of orders given by those in whose hands they have fallen, or for any hostile acts committed against
them." Id.
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FARC holds that humanitarian law is "open to interpretation."' 65 The paramilitaries
advocate a creole humanitarian law, by name."6
In essence, these arguments claim that the Colombian conflict is exceptional
and not readily amenable to general humanitarian norms. As such, a more conflictspecific set of rules are in order. Critics of this position, as well as of the Mainz
Agreement, perceive these proposals as merely disdainful of international law. In
other words, they are not taken seriously but rather equated with bad faith attempts
to justify these groups' flagrant violations. Rather than merely denounce what may
be at some level self-justifications for non-compliance, the distinction between a
universal law promoted by orthodox publicists and creole law pursued by others
deserves some attention, which is the topic of Section V below.
In any case, the Mainz Agreement controversy is another instance in which law
and peace were presented as opposing each other.
Clearly, some of the
Agreement's provisions were not in keeping with the strict scope of international
norms. Still, many of its provisions did reinforce humanitarian protections. Others
could be recognized for what they were: incremental application efforts, undeniably
short of full compliance. 67 In fact the Agreement does address the actual
conditions of Colombia's internal war. It directly confronted this reality and
attempted to regulate some of the more aberrant practices. The achievement of
reaching an agreement and securing some commitment to its enforcement is a
hugely significant step. It should not be so readily dismissed. And, more
importantly, there is no necessary reason to reject its legality based on international
law.
Under significant pressure, Colombia's Defense Minister ultimately retracted
his position and offered instead a tepid endorsement of the peace process. The
damage, however, was done. Once the experts had spoken, the document was
perceived as legally infirm and its chances for implementation were seriously
eroded. Significantly for the peace process, ad hoc humanitarian agreements are
high on the agenda, for negotiations with the FARC. An overly narrow
interpretation of the possibilities under international law will only make agreements,
and for that matter peace, more difficult to achieve.

165. WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 20, at 133 (citing interview with Marco Le6n Calarci,
Frente International - FARC, Mexico City (July 15, 1996)).
166. Id. at 110 (citing Bibiana Mercado & Orlando Le6n Restrepo, Las FarcInfltran los Partidos
Tradicionales,EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Sept. 29, 1997).
167. See, e.g. Claude Bruderlein, Desarrollo del Derecho Humanitario en Colombia: El Acuerdo
"Puertadel Cielo " en una Perspectiva Juridica Internacional. In La Otra Guerra: El Derecho como
Continuaci6n del Conflicto y Lenguaje de la Paz. (Mauricio Duque Ortiz trans., Oscar Eduardo
Guardiola Rivera et al. eds., 1999). 1999). Bruderlein finds in favor of the legal validity of the Mainz
Agreement as a whole under international law, with the possibility of denying validity to provisions
running afoul of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.
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B. PoliticalCrimes: Amnesties andPardons
On September 23, 1997, the Constitutional Court of Colombia limited the
scope of political crimes. 6 Historically, Colombian law accorded deferential
treatment to political crimes, particularly rebellion and sedition.' 69 The Penal Code
provides so by legislating relatively light sentences for these crimes and excluding
any additional sanction for any related offenses, committed while "in combat." That
is, assault, homicide and any other combat-related crime are subsumed within the
penalties for rebellion and sedition. It is this latter provision that the Court found
objectionable.'
The Court's majority embraced an alternative construction of the Penal Code.
It rejected the notion that combat-related crimes are to be subsumed under rebellion
and sedition. It viewed such crimes not as subsumed, but as separate. And, it held
the Code's provision on subsumable combat-related offenses to be a blanket
amnesty for independently triable offenses. Under this interpretation, it found such
an amnesty within the Penal Code to be procedurally and substantively
unconstitutional. 17'
Indirectly, the Court's decision leaves up for grabs the scope of amnesties and
pardons permissible under Colombian law. 72 This is so because, under the
Colombian constitution,"' amnesties and pardons may be granted only for political
crinmes. 174 Criminal offenses are excluded, and so are war crimes.'75 By narrowing
CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-456/97 (Sept. 23, 1997).
169. Colombian Penal Code of 1980, Article 127, before it was found unconstitutional, stated:
"Excluded Sentences: The rebels and seditious will not be subject to sentences for the criminal acts
committed in combat, provided that they do not constitute acts of ferocity, barbarity or terrorism." Note
that rebellion and sedition are themselves punishable offenses: the former by a 5 to 9 year prison term
and the latter by 2 to 8 years. Articles 125 and 126, as modified by Decree 1857 of 1989. COLOMBIAN
PENAL CODE OF 1980, art. 127 (Colom.).
170. The Court's majority ruling is based on a peculiar understanding of the workings of the Penal
Codes' provisions on political crimes. Rather than interpreting Article 127 as acting to subsume all
combat-related offenses as part of the (more lenient) sanctions for rebellion and sedition, respectively, it
takes another approach. The Court firmly distinguishes between "political crimes" and their "connected
crimes." The Court then interprets Article 127 as providing a blanket amnesty for all connected crimes.
This result it finds unconstitutional because such an amnesty does not conform to the procedural
requirements under Article 150 of the Colombian Constitutional and for a number of other fundamental
rights violations. CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-456/97 (Sept. 23, 1997).
171.
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 150 (1995). See also CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE
COLOMBIA, C-456/97 (Sept. 23, 1997). The Constitution requires that amnesties obtain a two-thirds
vote of Congress: the Penal Code requires only a majority vote for its adoption. Additionally, the Court
found that the provision violated the state's duty to ensure the right to life and full protection of the laws
of citizens and armed forces.
172. Notably, the ruling affects extraditions from Colombia. Extradition of Colombians has been
recently reinstated except in the case of political crimes. (CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art.
35(amended 1997) (amendment allows extradition of Colombian nationals, previously forbidden under
the criminal language of the 1991 constitution). Thus, a narrow definition of political crimes would
expand extradition. Considering the much drawn connections between guerrillas and drug-traffickers,
the Court's ruling considerably narrows the scope of the constitutional exception.
173. Id. at art. 150 and 201. See also CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-456/97 (Sept. 23,
1997).
174.
CONSTITuCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 150 and 201 (1995).

168.
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the category of political crimes, the Court deprived combat-related activity,
otherwise criminal, of the possibility of amnesty as political crime. An attempt to
forgive these actions would, thus, require an exemption from the prosecution of
common crime for which there is no general authority.
Amnesties and pardons, after the Court's ruling, are thus circumscribed to
crimes of opinion: the only meaning left for political crime. What were previously
connected offenses are now separately triable. It should be noted that the Court did
acknowledge that certain connected crimes may be separately pardoned by
Congress.'76 In other words, Congress can legislatively determine the scope of
political crimes and consequently the scope of available pardons. However, the
unconstitutionality of the criterion of combat-relatedness left the scope of
"permissibly connected" political crimes uncertain.' 77
In terms of the overall peace process, this legal obstacle has been overcome by
a constitutional amendment granting the president "superpowers" to exonerate all
types of crimes upon the signing of a peace accord. 7 For purposes of this
discussion, however, the more interesting point is the controversy surrounding the
Court's interpretation of the Penal Code. The ruling had a direct impact on the
outstanding political issue, once again, of prisoner exchanges of government
soldiers for incarcerated rebels.
The FARC particularly has been interested in obtaining the release of 500 or so
confederates in Colombian jails in exchange for approximately 245-300 soldiers
under their control.'79 The mothers of the captured soldiers have exhorted the

175. See Violadores de DD.HH.no son canjeables,EL TIEMPO (Bogota, Colom.). Oct. 23, 1998.
176. CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-456/97 (Sept. 23, 1997).
To the Congress will correspond, by way of extraordinary law [amnesty], the determination
of common crimes considered to be connected with those strictly political and that, by the
same token, can be covered by an amnesty or pardon. And which, by reason of their ferocity,
barbarity, of for being crimes of lesser humanity, cannot be covered . . . . The above
demonstrates the error of those that affirm that this declaration of unconstitutionality of
Article 127 makes more difficult a peace process with those outside the law. No, in an
eventual peace process, Congress can exercise its power, conferred by Article 150, numeral
17 of the Constitution. Peace need not be achieved by means of consecrating to permanent
impunity the worst criminal conduct.
177. Id.
In reality, Article 127 of the Penal Code pursues one sole purpose: "to remove criminal
sanction from punishable offenses committed in combat by rebels." After rejecting the
standard of combat-relatedness for its overbreadth and after emphasizing that political
crimes must be interpreted narrowly, the Court offers little direction in determining the scope
of their reach: "Rebellion and sedition are usually considered per se political crimes in our
legislation. In connection with these, other [crimes] may be committed that would separately
be common crimes, but because of their relation acquire the condition of connected crimes
and receive, or may receive, the favorable treatment reserved to political crimes.
178. See Pastranacon ampliopoderparaindultar,EL ESPECTADOR, Oct. 3, 1998.
179. See Cartaabiertaal Sehor Presidentede la Repdblica from Manuel Marulanda Vdlez, FARC
reprinted
at
leader,
to
President
Andrds
Pastrana
(Sept.
21,
1998)
htttp://www.presidencia.gov.co/pazl/farcl/21setie/htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2000). (Requesting a
prisoner exchange prior to the commencement of peace negotiations. In it, V6lez insists that the jailed
guerrillas are prisoners of war and not common criminals).
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government to undertake the exchange.'
The state, however, has resisted for
various reasons. As mentioned, returning FARC fighters to the field undercuts the
armed forces' military efforts.' The exchange has been stalled in part on the basis
of national legal impediments surrounding the release of common criminals from
jail.
The Court's decision is thus instrumental in this regard. It sets up the
impediment against prisoner exchanges. This decision, for our purposes, is
supported by international law arguments and by orthodox publicists. The
arguments here are twofold. First, undertaking a prisoner exchange, it is argued
once again, would strengthen the guerrillas' belligerency claims. As discussed in
detail above, prisoner exchanges are highlighted as the key element of an implicit
recognition. Second, international humanitarian law is irrelevant to this question.
Indeed, they affirm that Protocol II (now that it has been adopted), different from
the law applicable to belligerents, affirms state sovereignty and state discretion on
this point.
As such, internationalists support the Constitutional Court's decision which
more effectively criminalizes opponents of the state. The argument goes that
international humanitarian law for non-international conflict does not regulate
criminal penalties. Instead, the state has full discretion to criminalize insurgents to
whatever extent. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court's ruling more fully
criminalizes by narrowing the scope of constitutional pardons. To circumvent this
difficulty, various proposals have been advanced such as a national plebiscite on the
issue8 2 or granting conditional liberty, instead of a pardon.'83 Still, the legislature
has made use of the constitutional doubts raised by the Court to avoid action.
Opposing this state of affairs, the dissenting opinion and several commentators
have criticized the Court's opinion."' They argue against both its constitutionality
and its restrictions on amnesties and pardons. Pointedly, they advance their latter
claims also in terms of international humanitarian law.'85 Critics claim that the
180. See Rafael Guerrero, Libertadprovisional en vez de canje, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), Dec.
2, 1999.
181. See General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, La ley de 'canje', EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Oct. 8,
1999.
182. See Canje, a consulta popular, EL TIEMPO, Aug. 28, 1999, (under Article 104 of the
Constitution).
183. CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA C-456/97 (Sept. 23, 1997).
184. See Juan Gabriel G6mez Albarello, La Realizaci6n de Acuerdos Ad Hoc sobre Derechos
Humanos y Derecho Humanitario en El Salvador y la Ex-Yugoslavia in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
HUMANITARIO APPLICADO (Tercer Mundo Editores)

(1998); IvAN OROZCO ABAD, EL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO Y EL DELITO POLITICO: LA AGONIA DEL DELITO POLITICO. In Derecho

Internacional Humanitario Aplicado. Tercer Mundo Editores (1998) [hereinafter OROZCO).
185.
Ivin Orozco Abad characterizes the negative consequences of orthodox internationalism, or
the criminalization of the internal conflict, in the following way: "1) [it] makes invisible the political
nature of the war, in detriment of the distinction between political delinquents and common
delinquents, as well as [in detriment] of the negotiability of the conflict, and 2) [it] escalates the
potential criminalization of the armed political enemy of the State and expands the jurisdiction of
judges over the war." Furthermore, Orozco's argument holds that the emphasis in Protocol IL Article 3,
on sovereignty should not be understood as favoring the harsh criminalization of internal conflict.
Instead, Article 3 should be viewed in its historical terms as a necessary gesture to the times'
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Court violated the spirit if not the letter of Protocol II.", An expanded conception
of political crime, it is argued, is more in keeping with the spirit of international
humanitarian law.'87
The argument is that Protocol II's cornerstone is the distinction between
combatant and non-combatant. The Protocol holds all parties to the conflict to the
same standard for the benefit of those outside the conflict. This principle, it is
asserted, supports the Penal Code's criterion of combat-relatedness in the
determination of political crimes. The Court's rejection of this criterion, it is
argued, transgresses the line dividing parties to the conflict and those outside the
conflict. The criminalization of combat would thus make it equally criminal to fight
against government soldiers and unprotected civilians: thus violating the central
distinction between combatant and non-combatant and putting non-combatants in
jeopardy.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it stands as an alternative international
law-based argument.'88 And, it supports a broadened scope for political crimes
which would in turn permit extending an amnesty or pardon to many (but not all)
captured guerrillas under Colombia's constitution. Advocates of prisoner exchanges
highlight the authority provided under Protocol II and common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions to facilitate this process. Specifically, they point to the
favorable treatment of detainee releases in Protocol II. Additionally, they argue in
favor of a humanitarian accord under Article 3 which could provide the framework
for such an exchange.
Orthodox internationalists deny the relevance of international law all together.
On this point, they argue against international constraint in favor of state
sovereignty. Furthermore, they stand against prisoner exchanges, cautioning
against the implicit recognition of belligerency that it suggests.
Of course, maybe Colombia should not afford lenient treatment to rebels at all.
It may be argued that amnesties for political crimes should require a constitutional
amendment. It would also not be far-fetched to presume that the more lenient
treatment in Colombia's criminal law has contributed to the institutionalization of
political crime in that country. However, a shift to criminalization, at this juncture,
merely exacerbates the legal obstacles to a negotiated solution. Similar to
"narcotizing" the conflict, general criminalization swings the balance toward
sovereigntist concerns. In its application today, however, current notions of sovereignty should prevail.
In other words, international law should apply to the determination of political crimes. OROZCO, supra
note 184, at 345.
186. CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA, C-456/97 (Dissenting opinion by Magistrate Carlos
Gaviria Diaz).
187. See OROZCO, supra note 184, at 340-353.
188. See Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenges of Applying InternationalHumanitarianLaw
to InternalArmed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 916, 934-5 (1994). Lopez argues in favor of extending
prisoner-of-war privileges to internal combatants: "By refusing to accord the protections of the Geneva
Conventions to insurgents, governments may well be ensuring that rebels will use brutal tactics ....
After all, if the usual protections against prosecution for treason do not apply to the rebels, then the
usual criminal responsibility for violation of the Conventions is also inapplicable. Rebels must win at
all costs in order to avoid prosecution .... '9
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repression of political insurgents.
Furthermore, it constrains conciliatory
government action, as the example of prisoner exchanges demonstrates.
Moreover, the muting of international law by its orthodox proponents on this
issue underscores the prevailing militaristic valence of this legal discourse. While
in other settings international law is interpreted as pervasive, in this issue it is
presented as resoundingly silent. The state has broad latitude to do as it wishes.
Curiously, Colombian internationalists emphasize international humanitarian law
when it buttresses the state and criminalizes opponents, and dismiss it when it might
be used to negotiate. This is not to say that the opponents of the state do not work
in the same way. Indeed, international human rights observers note the purely
strategic use made of international humanitarian law by the guerrillas. However,
this realization merely reinforces the points made in this Article concerning law's
currently limited role in promoting peace.
Toward the end of 1999, legislation was introduced in the Colombian
legislature to authorize prisoner exchanges. 9 The bill provides for the signing of
humanitarian agreements that would serve as the basis for such exchanges. Political
crimes and connected offenses are both included as amenable to pardon. However,
the decision whether or not a criminal offense is a connected political crime is
vested in the Attorney General. The latter will be charged with the final
determination of "connectedness" in light of factual circumstances. Clearly, this is
an instance of legislative delegation, to put it kindly. Notably, the nation's Attorney
General has in the past endorsed using the legal system as an effective mode of
counter-insurgency. In other words, pardons are likely to be narrowly construed
thus adding another obstacle to prisoner exchanges.
V. ORTHODOX INTERNATIONALISM
Law figures prominently in Colombia's peace debate. As noted in the pages
above, international law, especially, informs discussions on prisoner exchanges,
demilitarized zones, humanitarian rules and the legal recognition of armed groups.
It is also expected to be instrumental in the context of current negotiations.
Disconcertingly, one particular version of international law precludes broad-ranging
debate.
In the main, publicists depict necessitarian rules of international law. 9 ° Legal
certainty is upheld while alternative solutions are simultaneously denied. 9' Texts
189. Tema del 'canje'porfinlleg6 al Congreso, ELTIEMPO (Bogotd, Colom.), Oct. 5, 1999.
190. The observations in this Article go beyond describing the traditional differences between
monist and dualist theories of international jurisdiction. Instead, they describe the narrowed conception
of international law produced by mainstream Colombian publicists. See MARCO GERARDO MONROY
CABRA, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 37-42, 183-89 (3a Edici6n, Editorial Temis: Santafd de
BogotA 1995), arguing against Colombian Constitutional Court review of international treaties as
required by constitutional mandate); PEDRO PABLO CAMARGO, TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
(Editorial Temis: Bogoti 1983) (advancing essentialist definitions of state sovereignty and subjects of
international law) See, e.g., ENRIQUE GAVIRIA LItVANO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO, (Tercera
Edici6n, Editorial Temis: 1988). Gaviria implements a positivist conception of international law while
maintaining a case-by-case approach to the question of international law's preeminence over municipal
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are limited to single interpretations, and otherwise expansive doctrines are cast in
narrow terms. Past practices and informal arrangements are minimized or
ignored.192 The result is an unduly limited and limiting depiction of law.'93
The category of orthodox internationalism, used in this article, amalgamates the
writings of Colombia's leading international law authorities. Clearly, this is not a
study of any particular scholar: nor can it attempt to represent the full complexities
of any individual or the whole group's work. As a result, it is limited to
representing certain characteristics displayed by the body of work cited in the pages
and footnotes of this article. The analysis presented here, thus, focuses on the
structure of arguments, rhetoric of argumentation, and political impact of this
selection. '
It is worth noting that what I describe as orthodox internationalism is not
simply privileging principles over pragmatism or politics. Some of its proponents
do indeed base their positions on principles. Others however insist on their own
correct reading of contemporary international law. In either case, orthodox
arguments demonstrate no less strategic positioning and political motivation than
other more openly pragmatic conceptions of law. Rhetorically, they claim to stand
for unchanging truths and the necessary nature of their positions.'95 In this way,
orthodox publicists have firmly lodged their policy choices as the dominant,
national understanding of international law."9
law (at least in the abstract); RAFAEL NIETO NAVIA, SOBRE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 215-62
(Pontificia Universidad Javeriana: Santafe de BogotM992) (advancing a framework of natural law
derived through reason, based on the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas); CABRA, LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS 134-35, 139-50 (Editorial Temis 1980) (arguing in favor of individuals as subjects of
international law); ALBERTO VERGARA MOLANO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO (la. Edicion.
Editorial Imprenta Nacional: Bogotd 1989) (formal presentations of contested international doctrines).
191.
Id.
192. Id.
193. My characterization of method, here, is not intended as a description of a necessarily coherent
or unwavering logic or methodology. Indeed, a strongly held political position may no doubt trump
methodological coherence on any one issue for any particular scholar. Conversely, however, the
methodological habit that I describe appears sufficiently established that it may also produce the
contrary situation of method trumping political preference on some particular issue. My aim in this
piece though is not testing the methodological consistency of what I call "orthodox internationalism."
Rather than a theory of method, my objective is to describe the political impact of mainstream
international law arguments in Colombia.
194. My apologies in advance to the scholars cited, for the picture presented here does not do
justice to the quality of any one individual's work. Rather, it sketches the general lines of a body of
work.
195. Using Marti Koskienniemi's terms, orthodox argument in Colombia can be characterized as a
descending type, rule approach to legal argument, which according to him constitutes only one side of a
plausible legal argument in contemporary international law. See MARTI KOSKIENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989). The mode in
which orthodox arguments are nonetheless sustained is one of the objects of this Article.
196. By orthodox legality, I do not mean that law or international law is forcefully enforced.
Clearly, the problem of legal enforcement and respect for international humanitarian law and human
rights is endemic in Colombia. I do not discuss those issues here. Rather, my focus is on the
construction of legality which is then the subject of enforcement actions. This is not to say that
Colombia should be held to lower standards or that by merely lowering the standards enforcement will
improve. Quite differently, I argue that the political project to which international law is put in
Colombia contributes to the pattern of selective enforcement.
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My reference to orthodox publicists also deserves another comment. The
phenomenon I describe here is the sort of legal scholarship associated typically with
civilian legal systems. The model is a hierarchical arrangement of legal authority
known as "la doctrine."'' Under this scheme, a handful or possibly only one or two
institutionally positioned authorities dominate a particular field. As a result, these
scholars wield significant power to speak for the law. This aspect of legal authority
surely contributes to the predominance of orthodox views in Colombia. It does not
however fully explain its sustaining force.
I have refrained, quite deliberately, from calling orthodox internationalism just
another version of legal formalist thinking. Indeed, one of the more common ideas
about law in Latin America is that it is uniformly formalist, especially indebted to
Hans Kelsen's positivism. This observation, without more, does not actually capture
either the methodological eclecticism or the political edge of the practice. Thus,
while positivism and formalism are clearly part of the argumentative repertoire, the
phenomenon described in the pages above cannot be reduced to just these. They
alone do not sustain orthodox arguments. The following sections examine the
strengths and especially the disadvantages of this particular, national version of
international law.
A. A Critique of its PracticalEffects

In terms of issues, orthodox arguments take aim against political recognition of
guerrilla groups and against mutual exchanges of captured combatants. They
support all-or-nothing humanitarian rules and rigid sovereignty standards.
Furthermore, orthodox publicists resist gradualist proposals for humanizing the war,
as much as they oppose eroding the current state. To this end, they reject doctrinal
innovation in dealing with the insurgents, and they erect formal obstacles against
prisoner exchanges.
Closing off most debate, orthodox publicists have established a hermetic
conception of international law. Stressing the authority and rigidity of its
constraints, they shield existing institutions from substantive change. Their account
of legality advances this objective. Passing as unequivocal law, their viewpoint is
raised above others, undermining reform-oriented opponents. Rather than expand
options, orthodox argument in fact limits the range of alternatives. Curiously, this
use of legal discourse has not been effectively challenged. Quite the opposite,
orthodox thinking dominates public discussions and for the most part determines
government policy. While divergent views, of course, exist they are not regarded as
law.
Notably, the current administration of Andrds Pastrana in Colombia has
resisted orthodox internationalism on key issues. On these questions, his critics
197. See generally, Philippe Jestaz and Christophe Jamin, The entity of French doctrine: some
thoughts on the community of French legal writers, 18 LEGAL STUDIES. THE SOCIETY OF PUBLIC
TEACHERS OF LAW, UNITED KINGDOM (1998) (excellent description of the phenomenon of "la doctrine"
in France).
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have abounded. Indeed, most lawyers and non-lawyers alike have been trained in
the orthodoxy. Instances where the government and internationalists are at odds
have demonstrated the dissonance between a peace policy and orthodox legality.'98
The government, even one as committed to the peace process as Pastrana's, has not
been able to supply sound, alternative legal arguments. Instead, it has mostly
justified its actions on the basis of over-riding political goals.'" Peace negotiations
are thus narrowly close to illegal and thus illegitimate. Compromise beyond the
legal limits, moreover, endangers the government's own legitimacy and its authority
to act. Proceeding in this way risks a peace accord that is either legally invalid or
one so narrowly legal that it has virtually no effect.
This orthodox reading of international law threatens to defeat the peace process
and to reinforce the likelihood of continued war in Colombia. Its terms refuse to
engage the sources of internal violence and to structure broad-ranging institutional
reform. Left unchallenged, it stands to supply quite limited arrangements,
foregoing the peace process's potential for redistributing power. This narrowing of
alternatives vastly undermines the type of reform needed to end the confrontation. It
places a pro-peace government, such as the current one, in a precarious position.2"
Furthermore, orthodox arguments actually undermine any potential utility to
which an international approach may be put. The narrowness of its positions is
likely to frustrate the flow of negotiations. Instead of hemming in the process, it
could lead to a rejection of broader international terms all together. This likelihood
is foreshadowed in the statements of rebel leaders this past year.2 ' Pointedly, in the
course of pre-negotiations, the FARC refused to submit to international
jurisdiction. 22 Specifically, they rejected an international verification commission
within the de-militarized zone during the course of peace negotiations. Pastrana
had initially demanded an international verification. International verification

198. Responding to the observation that in Colombia pursuing peace through law is perceived as
war-mongering, the leader of the Conservative Party, Enrique Gomez Hurtado insists: "If I were to say,
in any country in the world, that what is needed is the empire of law, I would be seen as a fool, because
that is like saying it is daytime." Apoyo al proceso de paz tiene limites: Enrique Gdmez, EL TIEMPO
(Bogota, Colom.), Aug. 20, 1999.
199. The situation of past President Ernesto Samper Pizano, although different, is illustrative. The
Administration's perceived illegality in running its campaign financing undermined its ability to
negotiate a peace agreement with rebel groups. While the rebels refusal may be taken as mere
opportunism, it does demonstrate the link between government legality and the ability to conduct the
peace process.
200. President Pastrana's inability to make significant headway on the peace process threatens his
political program. One year after his election, his approval rating has dropped from a 65 to 30% .
Support for his peace program has similarly eroded from 74 to 40% of those surveyed. El pals, por
mal camino, EL TIEMPO (Bogot, Colom.), Aug. 1, 1999.
201. The FARC declared themselves not bound to the letter of international humanitarian law but
only to the extent it coincided with their internal regulation.
202. Larry Rohter, Like Carrot,Stick Fails with Rebels in Colombia. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1999,
at A9.
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beyond giving the government added leverage also responded to U.S. pressure for
greater control over the zone.2"3
As fall-back positions, Pastrana then proposed a joint commission of FARC
and government officials and later an international humanitarian agreement
covering the zone. Both were again rejected by the FARC. Furthermore, contrary
to their long-standing position, they then declared themselves not bound by
international humanitarian law.2" Clearly, this is a substantial retrenchment. In the
past, the FARC have consistently affirmed their humanitarian obligations." 5 Indeed,
they have used it to bolster their arguments in support of belligerency status.
Pastrana's condition of international verification and later his fall-back
humanitarian agreement seem to have backfired. Coupled with the government's
past insistence on a highly formal and rigid interpretation of humanitarian law, it is
not that surprising that the guerrillas have rejected their application. Instead of
international law, the FARC now sustain the applicability of their own internal
humanitarian rules."°
Of course, it may be said this merely shows the guerrillas' bad faith with
respect to international humanitarian law: using it as a shield against the
government and discarding it when turned against them. This is no doubt true. All
sides use legal argument strategically. This is different, though, than upholding only
one set of positions as lawful, as a matter of international law. Monopolizing legal
argument in this way undermines the utility of law as an instrument for peace.
Faced with purportedly intractable norms, the peace process may be forced to
proceed, if at all, on a purely national footing. While not necessarily determinative
of success or failure, such a result would sideline international advantages, not to
mention the risks of international isolation. In any event, the process would become
more insular as well as more vulnerable to destabilizing pressure from both the
radical right and the radical left.
Less overtly, orthodox positions also restrict the potential scope of
international law. Indeed, this particular reading of the law circumscribes
international jurisdiction rather than enlarges it. Its insistence on strict notions of
sovereignty and belligerency attempt to constrain outside involvement that may
203. See generally La encruciada del gobierno, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Oct. 11, 1999.
(Presenting the dilemma of either losing U.S. assistance as a result of not asserting control over the
demilitarized zone or insisting on an international commission and jeopardizing the peace talks).
204. See generally WAR WITHOUT QUARTER, supra note 20, at 133-41 (points out that the FARC
pays only lip service to international humanitarian law, proclaiming their adherence when politically
beneficial and violating its norms whenever else. While no doubt the humanitarian record of all the
parties is inconsistent at best, still the outright rejection of international humanitarian norms is a
significant change in position).
205. See, e.g., Sarmiento, supra note 38, at 273 (citing the Resoluci6n Poliitica de la Cumbre
Constitutiva de la Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera Sim6n Bolivar, Oct. 1987: the umbrella guerrilla
organization in the 1980's committed itself to respecting the Geneva Agreements); see also LA PAZ,
supra note 13, at 39-40 (in which the FARC reaffirm the pronouncement of the guerrilla coordinator).
206. Pastrana's government ultimately went forward with initiating talks upon the FARC's
recognizing the constitutional authority of town mayors, within the demilitarized zone, to receive
complaints from local citizens of human rights abuses. Clave, comenzar por la humanizaci6n, EL
TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), Oct. 18, 1999.
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threaten the Colombian state. The attention paid to traditional belligerency doctrine
attests to this concern. As such, the range of possible international involvement
deemed acceptable is diminished. International jurisdiction is relegated to merely
identifying the state as the winner of this contest.
Rejecting orthodox legality while advocating internationalism, however, entails
more than merely replacing one set of propositions for another. It requires
redrawing the lines of legality and illegality that orthodox discourse has made so
natural. In the alternative, the habit of orthodox argument will continue to define
the legitimate and the illegitimate; the legal and the political; war and
transformation. In short, the lines must be redrawn to recognize peace and
transformation as both legitimate and legal. A different and more expansive
conception of international law could expand the range of options for both the
government and the guerrillas. Options that are completely in keeping with actual
international practice may then more effectively form part of the negotiations.
Possibly for many Colombians, international law - and not much else holds the promise of disinterested rules and neutral authority: a means to resolve
the conflict. However, as this Article illustrates, orthodox internationalism is
neither disinterested nor is it the best promise for an enduring peace. As shown in
the examples above, the mainstream Colombian position has more to do with
holding the guerrillas at bay, on any one point, than with applying a coherent legal
methodology or upholding a transnational ideological position.
B. Critique of CulturalRhetoric
Another way to understand the hold of orthodox internationalism is provided
by references to its alternatives. While orthodox internationalism depicts legality as
clear and inflexible, alternative positions are presented within the discourse as ad
hoc, heterodox, creolized, °7 or merely political. In this way, for example, local
humanitarian agreements are dismissed as invalid creole versions of international
law. Also, novel doctrinal approaches to accommodate prisoner exchanges or
human rights enforcement are rejected as not part of the international regime. In
short, positions at odds with orthodox readings are cast as native solutions or halfbreeds not belonging to the order of international law.
While no doubt the political project of conservative publicists draws adherents
on its own strength, it does not explain the vast marginalization of counterarguments of international law. Understanding orthodox internationalism less in
terms of its particular politics in each case and more a rejection of a devalued
identity or cultural position may also provide a key to its pervasiveness. Indeed the
alternative, criollo identity, marks a distinctive project of Latin American
particularity within international law. Its proponents over the past two centuries

207. My use of "creole" refers to the mixed race and/or mixed culture aspect of the term; my use of
"criollo" denotes the particular way in which this concept was elaborated in Spanish colonized America.
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gained no few objectives,"' to which their work stands witness today. However, a
Latin American or criollo internationalism has remained at most an unrealized
endeavor and a marginal stream of scholarship. The current debates in Colombia
demonstrate how marginal indeed. Specifically, positions of international law
rejected by the orthodoxy are not only branded as not law but also denigrated as
criollo.
The term "criollo" was not always a racial marker.2" Instead, it distinguished
between white Spaniards born in Spain, peninsulares, and white Spaniards born in
the Spanish colonies, criollos.21 ° The designation was particularly burdensome for
criollos,2 " especially towards the latter part of Spanish rule, since it entailed a
preclusion from high-ranking posts in the colonial administration."' Leaders of
Latin American independence seized on criollo-ness as a sign of national identity.213

208.

See generally Ruben Dario L6pez Z., Bolivar y el Derecho de Gentes, 45 ESTUDIOS DE

DERECHO 143 (1986) (tracing several foundational notions of a Latin American international law to

Bolivar, such as the principle of non-intervention, the doctrine of utis possidetis jure, the peaceful
mediation of international controversies, and humanitarian law).
209. See Anthony Pagden, Identity Formation in Spanish America, in THE LANGUAGES OF
POLITICAL THEORY IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1987). The term simply means "native-born." Its
multiple references in Mexico, for example, are described by Pagden in the following way: by 1579 it
became a term of abuse; in 1634 the white population of Mexico was described as constituted by two
nations, "criollos and Castilians"; by 1681 a promoter of Indian culture posited the "criollo nation." Id.
at 79. Based on eighteenth-century theories of environmental and climactic determination of character
and disposition, traits associated with the Indians came to be ascribed to the criollos, triggering a
particular and valuable identity. Id. at 80-83. By the late eighteenth century, oppression of the Indians
was assimilated to criollo oppression by Spain and formed the basis of independence uprisings. Id. at
77-79.
210. See id. Pagden traces the internal conflict embodied in "criollo" identity: "the criollos... had
been accused by the peninsular Spaniards of being half-breeds (mestizos). But because the term
mestizo suggested racial inferiority, it could not be applied to those who had married into the Indian
nobility. They, in some unspecified sense, were pure. Yet too close an association with Indian blood,
however noble, might imply an uncomfortably close link with living Indians ....The criollos wished to
assume a direct link through kin with an ancient Indian past that would provide them with an
independent historical identity; at the same time they needed to avoid, in a society so obsessed with
racial purity, any suggestions that this association might have contaminated their blood. This
undertaking proved ultimately to be a ludicrous one." Id.
211. See John Lynch, The Origins of Spanish American Independence, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 3 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1985). "All Spaniards might be equal before the law,
whether they were peninsularesor creoles. But the law was not all. Essentially Spain did not trust
Americans for positions of political responsibility; peninsular-born Spaniards were still preferred in
higher office and transatlantic commerce." Id. at 26.
212. See id. at 27. "The imperial government emerged from its inertia and from 1750 it began to
reassert its authority, reducing creole participation in both church and state, and breaking the links
between bureaucrats and local families. Higher appointments in the Church were restored to
Europeans. Among the new intendants it was rare to find a creole. A growing number of senior
financial officials were appointed from the peninsula. Creole military officers were replaced by
Spaniards on retirement. The object of the new policy was to de-Americanize the government of
America, and in this it was successful." Id. at 27.
213. See SIM6N BOLIVAR, THE JAMAICA LETTER (1815). "[W]e are neither Indian nor European,
but a species midway between the legitimate owners of this country and the Spanish subjugators ....
Though Americans by birth we derive our rights from Europe, and we have to assert these rights against
the rights of the natives, and ...against the invaders."
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Indeed, the notion was widely propagated by 19th century nation-builders." 4 It
came to encompass both European and non-European elements and marked a
distinctive resolution to the question of Latin America's membership within the
15
civilized world.
In the field of international law, the criollo was associated with the project of a
uniquely Latin American version of international law. To describe the specific
content of this criollo law would fill the pages of a different article." 6 However, in
general terms, it reinforced concepts of non-intervention and sovereignty based on,
as opposed to despite,217 racial heterogeneity. It was never fully embraced by Latin
American publicists. Indeed, the foremost Latin American jurist, Andr~s Bello,
acknowledged its existence only to question its viability at the time. Instead, he
advanced an essentially natural law approach to the then existing world order, by
emphasizing Latin America's place within the universe of civilized nations."'
A Latin American or criollo version of international law did not expire
completely. On the contrary, it gave rise to the Organization of American States

214. SIMON BOLIVAR, DISCURSO ANTE EL CONGRESO DE ANGOSTURA (Feb. 15, 1819) "We do not
even maintain the vestiges of what once was; we are not Europeans, [nor] are we Indians, instead [we
are] a middle species between the aborigines and the Spanish. Americans by birth, Europeans by
right." Id.
215. See J. Jorge Klor de Alva, The Postcolonization of the (Latin) American Experience: A
Reconsideration of "Colonialism," "Postcolonialism," and "Mestizaje", in AFTER COLONIALISM:
IMPERIAL HISTORIES AND POSTCOLONIAL DISPLACEMENTS 241 (1995). KIor de Alva notes, "Together
with Euro-Americans-most of whom, by the eighteenth century, were of mixed genes although
culturally criollo--and some Europeans (commonly called peninsulares)... substantially Westernized
mestizos, in subaltern and elite sectors, made up the bulk of the forces that defeated Spain during the
anti-imperialist, nineteenth-century wars of independence. The newly independent countries, under
criollo/mestizo leadership, sought to construct their national identities through three sets of maneuvers"
promoting Euro-American practices, weakening local "Indian" identities, and championing a common
ethnicity out of a supposed shared experience of mestizaje/crioUismo and/or imperial exploitation." Id.
at 246-47.
216. This article on a criollo version of international law is currently in progress: LILIANA
OBREGON, BETWEEN CIVILIZATION AND SAVAGERY: NATION BUILDING AND (SPANISH)

AMERICAN

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY (manuscript on file with author).

217. Possibly a more strategic stance, Sim6n Bolivar presents the argument of recognition despite
heterogeneity: "Of the ... indigenous, African, Spanish and mixed nations, the minority is certainly
white; but it is also true that whites possess the intellectual qualities that give a relative numerical
equality and a vast influence of moral quality and physical circumstances which will be apparent to
those
who judge
us."
SIMON
BOLIVAR,
CARTA
DE
JAMAICA
(1815),
at
http://www.analitica.com/biblioteca/bolivar/jamaica.asp.
218.
Andr6s Bello made the argument for Latin America's inclusion within the European system
based on its membership in "a family of states, which recognizes a common law infinitely more liberal
than anything that has borne this name in antiquity and in the rest of the globe, they owe it to the
establishment of Christianity and the progress of civilization and culture, accelerated by the printing
press, the spirit of trade that has come to be one of the chief regulators of politics, and the system of
actions and reactions which, in the bosom of that great family as in the bosom of each state, unceasingly
struggles against preponderance of any kind." ANDRtS BELLO, SELECTED WRITINGS OF ANDRS
BELLO, 232 (1997). See also EDUARDO PLAZA A., INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE
ANDRES BELLO (1955) (noting Bello's alternative articulation of this belief as including "the
development of the species" as an attribute of state kinship).
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and projects of Latin American unification." 9
More poignantly, certain
international law doctrines22 ° are at least nominally identified with Latin American
particularity.22"' The argument for a separate identity within international law was
forcefully made, in our era, by Alejandro Alvarez:222
There is no doubt then that an American InternationalLaw exists, not only
as a combination of doctrines, problems, institutions proper to the New
World, but a veritable continentalLaw possessing a proper existence and
founded on
the conditions of international life on the American
223
continent.

Regardless of the longevity of this tradition within Latin America, it has not
attained the status of mainstream discourse. Colombia today is a case in point.
Rather than criollo exceptionalism, the legal orthodoxy stands for a classical
219. See Institut amdricain de Droit International, FundamentalRights of the American Continent
(American Public International Law), Acte final de la Session de la Havane, 22-27janvier 1917 in
ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 197-98 (1924) [hereinafter ALVAREZ].
220. See id. at 255. Note that Dr. Drago articulates his doctrine as resting on an American
international policy as opposed to a juridical doctrine: "[It would perhaps not be impossible for
England to accept the Argentine doctrine with respect to the South American States, as it has admitted
the Monroe Doctrine with respect to them, but it is a mistake to suppose that it would ever declare its
intervention in Egypt illegal... As a thesis of American policy, we can maintain the doctrine... with
some hope of more or less remote success." Id. at 255. See also Luis Maria Drago, State Loans in
Their Relation to International Policy, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 710 (1907). Cf ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AMERICAIN (1910). Alvarez raises the Monroe Doctrine to the level of a
principle of international law as a result of the number of states laying claim to it and the justice in the
name of which it is claimed. Note that while Alvarez adopts the Monroe Doctrine as a cornerstone of
an American international law, he does so by stripping it of the hegemonic policy carried out by the
U.S. Cf. Santiago Perez Triana, Letter to Jos Vicente Concha, President of Colombia, of September
1914 in ALVAREZ, supra note 219 (urging the adoption and expansion of the Monroe Doctrine, clearly
in more strategic terms, as a way to stem further U.S. imperialism).
221. See Raymundo Wilmart, The Monroe Doctrine-The Drago Doctrine-Views, in ALVAREZ,
supra note 219, at 371. Distinguishing between an American and European international law: "The
international community is often directed velis nolis by the so-called 'European concert'; the time has
come for the smaller nations to demand a legitimate share in the direction of international affairs ....
Latin-American nations especially may demand voice and vote .. " Id.
222. Alvarez adopts a sociological account of international law: "Law is a social and psychological
phenomenon.., in international life, when this [juridical] conscience is shared by all states, [it] gives
birth to the law of peoples. And if a juridical conscience exists that is proper to a region or to a
determinate group of states, this gives birth to a particular law relative to said region or said group of
states to which universal international law should pay heed... The states of the New World create, in
the interior of universal society, a soul, a personality of their own and, from that fact, can give birth to
specific institutions and principles of international law... The existence of American international law
confers on world international law the character which should be its own in the future, namely that the
precepts of this law are not all nor always universal." ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
NOUVEAU DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LA VIE ACTUELLE DES PEUPLES 99-100 (1959).
223. ALVAREZ, supra note 219, at 99. Note Alvarez's general description of an "American" rather
than an exclusively Latin American or criollo legality: "For an institution, an organism, a principle to be
considered as being American International Law, it is not necessary that they be accepted by all states of
the New World. The same thing occurs here as with universal international law. If it is the case,
however, that a very important country, the United States for example, does not admit certain of these
principles, such as asylum, then one can say that they are just Latin American." Id. at 100.
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version of internationalism. As a mode of argumentation, it rejects alternative
interpretations of international law as invalidly criollo. While the epithet mobilizes
the historical baggage of racial impurity, heterogeneity, and questionable
legitimacy, it also signals the rejection of Latin America's tradition of particularity
within international law. Of course, it is not the object of this piece to examine the
actual particularity or distinctiveness of a criollo or Latin American international
law. More importantly for this analysis is the way the legal orthodoxy excludes
common-sense proposals from consideration.
Thus, when orthodox proponents devalue opposing positions as creolized
versions of formal law, it reflects more than a legal argument or even a political
view. They invoke the racial identity of law. They also assume the superior racial
position. In terms of sovereignty, orthodoxism makes the case for equal standing
with "civilized nations" based on the membership of universal law. To the extent
that sovereignty has been racialized in this way, its continuing defense requires
Considering that respect for
upholding the position of racial superiority.
sovereignty has been a hard fought demand of Latin American countries,2 24 the
Cast as creole,
tenacity of this identification becomes all the more clear.22
opponents of orthodox views are placed in the position of arguing both from and for
the position of racial inferiority, a significant disadvantage. Indeed, it requires
arguing against the very sovereignty of the state, for its international standing is
premised on the exclusion of creole variants from the international system.
Ironically, criollo internationalism was historically about expanding state
sovereignty, although via a different strategy. Its purported genesis in the Monroe
Doctrine, later elaboration through the Drago and Calvo doctrines, and subsequent
development responded to European and later U.S. imperialism. Thus, a universal
law approach was not the unrivaled standard bearer of sovereignty demands.
Actually, universalism has offered the basis for European colonialism as well. As
such, orthodox arguments are no more singularly protective of sovereignty rights
than what a well-elaborated criollo alternative might offer. 26 Criollismo, by
modem standards, is in fact more in line with Third Worldism and militant
sovereignty. In any case, both orthodox and criollo discourses offer well-developed
defenses of state sovereignty. Thus, the current dichotomization of the two can be
little sustained on the basis of this point.
224. See Berman, supra note 112, at 475-77 (discussing proposals to exclude non-European states
from the reach of codified belligerency doctrine at the 1900 meeting of the Institut de Droit
International in NeufchCatel). Although the proposal was rejected, the understanding was that the rules
were intended for "civilized powers." See id.
225. See generally Antolin Diaz Martinez, Derecho Internacional Pfiblico, in DERECHO DE GENTES
- GEO POLTICA (2d ed. 1986) Diaz Martinez presents an unrelenting position on the universality of
international law: "The contrary (to universalism) is inane in the face of science, in the same way that
the criterion of 'the sovereignties' to an extreme may come to parcel culture, and with that to expect to
parcel the human intellect." Id. at 54. He decries panamericanism in international law as a result of its
cooptation by the U.S., which deployed it to further its own interests in Latin America. Id. at 215.
226. See id. at 215. See also, ALVAREZ, supra note 219 (Alvarez demonstrates how the Monroe
Doctrine became an instrument of U.S. imperialism under Theodore Roosevelt. Alvarez, however,
attempts to rescue its principles as the basis for an American international law).
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In most instances, the underlying criollo argument, in Colombian debates,
reflects nothing more than a commonly-accepted alternative of international law or
Still, such alternatives are projected as threatening to the formal
practice.
conception of the state. Thus, labeling arguments for belligerency, for instance, as
hybrid or criollo, calls into question their standing as acceptable law. In fact, it
recalls the very opposite: lawless societies.
As a result, Colombian publicists' preoccupation with the current state
contributes to its rejection of plausible alternatives - not otherwise rejected in
international practice. Mainstream internationalists deploy a racialized ordering of
arguments to buttress their own positions. In this way, alternatives are categorized
as non-law. Rebutting orthodox internationalism therefore requires addressing its
racial and cultural dimensions. The task entails not merely replacing one set of
propositions for another as would be, for example, the elaboration of a system of
creole law. This would do nothing to prevent, say, a creole orthodoxy from taking
form. Moreover, it re-emphasizes the distinction between creole and European.227
In fact, there is not much basis to believe anything substantially different would
result from such a shift.
By contrast, embracing creole positions as equally law recognizes a broader
band of political and cultural perspectives. No separate system of law need be
devised. Instead, the local creativity that gives rise to the epithet should be valued.
At a minimum, the expanded field may provide some impetus for the peace process.
The interests that stand against its acceptance - orthodox internationalism,
preserving the current state, and social hierarchy - are also the ones with the least
stake in a negotiated solution.
My claim here is not that every objection to a heterodox or criollo law is a
deliberate rejection of the project of a Latin American international law. Clearly,
such objections are obviously not well-considered judgments against particularism
in international law. Nor are they even well-considered votes against a separate
body of law. Ascribing to them either of these meanings would overstate my point.
The use of these same notions does, however, seek to reinforce the expositor's own
position.
Specifically, orthodox internationalists mobilize the tropes of
particularism and relativity to characterize the positions they reject. By stark
contrast, orthodox positions claim the high ground of principledness and
universalism. Of course, as we have seen, they are no more so: they are as political
and as particular as the alternatives may be. They stand, though, for a different
praxis and different set of particulars.
Curiously, orthodox internationalism is itself the particular, national version of
international law which its proponents claim to reject. Not so much that it stands
227. Curiously, the Colombian guerrilla group, the ELN, espouses this dichotomous idea about
cultural identity. Mestizaje - as opposed to a national identity - is posited as the essential base of
Latin American identity. It is described as a tendency to action over theory, consciousness that
combines feeling and thought in a spiritual way, and an appreciation of the world grasped more through
intuition than reason. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE UNION
CAMILISTA- ELN at 214 (1965).
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for an autochthonous version of international law; on the contrary, it deploys the
language of universalism. However, by suppressing the full range of international
law authority from national discourse, orthodox publicists have in effect created a
local version of the practice of international law. This type of particularity,
however, looks to exclude other viewpoints and to place its own positions beyond
scrutiny.
C. Critique of PoliticalEffectiveness
In terms of repressing a guerrilla take-over, orthodox internationalism also fails
on this score. Advancing a rigid set of prescriptions for sovereignty, belligerency
and humanitarian accords has the primary effect of demonstrating the vast
shortcomings of state institutions. By most accounts, the Colombian state is
vulnerable over wide areas of its territory. Its military and law enforcement
capabilities are seriously challenged.
Thus, as a yardstick, orthodox
internationalism is a greater indictment of current institutions than the guerrilla
uprising itself may represent.
By contrast, a modern version of international law may actually benefit the
existing state. Humanitarian accords, while not necessarily more lax, may
acknowledge the particularities of Colombia's guerrilla warfare and its protagonists.
Civil society may take a more prominent role in crafting humanitarian accords and
peace agreements, without the threat of compromising the state's international
standing. More international pressure may be brought to bear on groups which
systematically violate human rights and displace entire populations.
Legal
incentives may be fitted to advance policy interests such as greater humanitarian
law compliance and possibly the extended detention of captured insurgents.
International verification of de-militarized zones and foreign mediators may be
more seamlessly introduced.
Of course, the motivation of defeating the guerrillas may overstate the political
zeal of some orthodox internationalists. These may have no interest in simply
articulating an international law framework for the state's self-preservation. This
observation however would leave the peculiarity of orthodox internationalism to be
explained by nothing more than a quirk of professionalized practice. Mere
disciplinary convention would account for its continued authority. As discussed in
detail above, orthodoxism does not conform to the modern practice of international
law. And, under the hypothesis here, it would also not comport with the political
beliefs of its practitioners. Thus, under this scenario, its persistence can only be
understood either as an idealistic faith or simply a miscalculation. In either case,
orthodox internationalism does not provide a way out of Colombia's internal
conflict.
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VI. U.S.-DRIVEN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
Beyond the shortcomings of an orthodox version, which can be corrected for,
international law discourse more broadly speaking presents other significant
disadvantages to the peace process. Its range and political orientation are driven by
the interests of the international community and its leading members. In the case of
Colombia, those interests reach as far as effective law enforcement against the drug
trade and greater security for foreign investment. While clearly important, an
exclusive focus on these objectives sorely misses the longer-standing causes of this
civil conflict.
International solutions backed by multilateral support are likely to emphasize
the transnational consequences of the Colombian crisis. That is, international
support and international pressure are sure to be forthcoming in areas that affect
regional stability or the critical drug trade. To the extent that these are important
factors in the Colombian conflict, they have a receptive international audience.
However, other important if not more important factors involve the redistribution of
political power and an equitable increase in economic wealth across Colombian
society. These causes of political violence precede the drug trade and surely
precede the recent cross-border activity by the rebels. The changes that may be
necessary, in the course of peace negotiations, may not be well supported by
international consensus.
As concerns economic policy, developing countries such as Colombia have
little effective recourse in the international sphere. The currently prevailing neoliberalism may not be sufficiently synchronized so as to encourage redistributive
policies and programs. In terms of drug policy, little independence can be asserted
in light of the overwhelming international pressure Colombia faces. However, drug
eradication efforts may need to take a back seat to a peace convention. At least in
the short term, a de-militarized zone or more than one may be necessary in which to
conduct peace talks. As such, international pressure against de-militarization, for
example, or other aspects of the peace talks may run counter to ending the war.
Without a doubt, the lion's share of international support will be U.S. driven.228
As such, U.S. objectives and preoccupations immediately rise to the forefront.229

228. A foreign assistance bill in the amount of U.S.$1.3 billion over the next three years was
introduced in Congress in October 1999. The bill conditions assistance on the military's severing its ties
with paramilitarism; respect for human rights, state control over the demilitarized zone; and extradition
of Colombian nationals to the U.S. The bill also calls on the Clinton Administration to develop a
strategy on Colombia within 60 days. See Military Aid Conditionedon Control over the Demilitarized
Zone, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Oct. 21, 1999. President Clinton announced that he will ask
Congress early next year to increase economic and anti-narcotics aid but not anti-insurgency aid. More
Colombia Aid Urged,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at A10.
229. Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, presents a clear picture
of U.S. political interests: conservative Republicans focused exclusively on battling drugs, micromanaging aid exclusively to the anti-narcotics police and opposed peace negotiations; Democrats
concerned about the Colombian army's human rights record and links to paramilitaries who want to
withhold support from the military and rely on the peace process to deal with guerrillas; and Pastrana's
Plan, supported by the Clinton Administration, of economic aid ($1.5 billion from the U.S.) to
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The left-wing guerrillas recognize as much and have threatened to withdraw from
the talks if U.S. involvement continues. Disregarding this position, which the U.S.
has resolved to do, may very well be correct. However, making U.S. interests the
matrix for assistance will not resolve the problem of political violence in Colombia
nor will it be effective.230 The words of Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the Clinton
administration's Colombia expert, reveal the incongruity of current policy:
"[P]eaceat any price" is fool's gold .... We have made clear to all
parties that the peace process must support and not interfere with
counternarcotics cooperation, and that any agreement must permit
continuedexpansions of all aspects of our cooperation.23"'
First, it must be remembered that drug-trafficking is not the root cause of political
violence - even if it does help to finance it. Thus, eradicating drugs will not
eliminate political violence. Second, placing drug interdiction ahead of the peace
process inverts the common wisdom on the interrelatedness of Colombia's
problems.232 Finally, a peace process subject to the short-term dictates of U.S. drug
policy puts the cart before the horse. In this order both are likely to fail. Without a
stable institutional order, no policy much less an aggressive drug policy stands a
chance.
Thus, international competence over negotiations is a double-edged sword. An
internationally-overseen process would introduce a set of additional interests.
Stronger than the international goal posts to which the Colombians may themselves
adhere, direct foreign participation will have an impact on negotiations, in what
direction remains to be seen. Conditions could foreseeably include the eradication
of the drug trade, military control over the entire territory, extradition of former
narco-insurgents, as well as, respect for human rights, severing links to
paramilitarism, and democratic governance among others. While these may be
characterized as simply implementing the current world consensus, they are more
controversial. Some of them foster a peace-oriented engagement with Colombia,
others reflect interests less conducive to peace.

strengthen the Colombian army and reinvigorate the economy. Peter Hakim, Backing Colombia's Fight,
Money Well-spent, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 30, 1999 at 11.
230. Even right-wing Colombian commentators worry about the primacy of a U.S. agenda in
exchange for aid. The concern is that not enough military aid will be forthcoming as a result of liberal
sentiment in the U.S. Id. See also, Miguel Posada, No dan putada sin dedal, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti,
Colom.), Oct. 15, 1999.
231. Hearings,supra note 16, at 16.
232. Of course, this wisdom is not shared by all U.S. politicians who see Colombia's internal
conflict solely in terms of the drug war. For example, Senator Jesse Helms has stated: "Without U.S.
help, Colombia could lose this war - or seek to appease the narco-guerrillas. Either scenario would
spell disaster for Colombia, her neighbors.., and the American people." Id. (statement of Senator Jesse
Helms).
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A. Proposalsfor US. Assistance
Threatening the potential for peace, a sort of orthodox thinking also threatens
to dominate U.S. policy on Colombia. 3 Although broader international relations
may not be affected,234 Colombia policy has succumbed to this thinking.235 Beyond
other effects, its implementation would reinforce the general orientation of orthodox
thinking in Colombia: heightening the confrontation and limiting international
mediation. Following is a discussion of three salient U.S. positions which have
emerged with respect to Colombia.
The main issue driving U.S. policy on Colombia is the drug war.236
Undoubtedly, this issue is inescapable. However, at one end of the political
spectrum, the concern with drugs rises to the level of eclipsing all other questions
raised by the Colombian conflict. To the extent proponents of this position focus
on Colombia's political war at all, they attribute its causes to the overwhelming
drug trade. While the history of political violence in Colombia is generally
acknowledged, its newly alarming levels are associated with the flood of drug
money financing opponents of the state. 3 Animating their reaction, proponents
view the Colombian situation as a direct danger to U.S. national security. For them,
the U.S. is already at war in Colombia. Assistance proposals are thus necessarily

233. U.S. officials overwhelmingly endorse a negotiated solution to the Colombian conflict. See,
e.g., U.S. State Department Delegation's Trip to Colombia and Venezuela, Foreign Press Center
Briefing Transcript (Aug. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Press Center Briefing], available at
http://www.vsia.gov/regional/ar/colombia/fpcpick899.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2000). Undersecretary
of State Thomas Pickering stated in the briefing: "I think [it] is inevitably true in Colombia, that there
'isn't a military solution to this problem - that there is a negotiated solution to this problem, and that a
negotiated solution, obviously, is something that requires that both sides negotiate." Id. See generally
Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Harold Hongu Koh, remarks to the
Conference on Human Rights in Colombia, (Apr. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Remarks of Hongju Koh].
However, this Article attempts to identify how U.S. policy and the arguments upon which it is built may
in fact contribute to an intensification of the conflict. By normalizing a set of perceptions and beliefs as
natural or even logically entailed, U.S. action may be more in line with opponents of the peace process
in Colombia than with its supporters.
234. Interestingly, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Harold Hongju
Koh, speaking in the frame of human rights proposes five steps toward peace: (1) negotiating an end to
the conflict; (2) cutting the ties between paramilitaries and the military; (3) addressing issues of
impunity of the security forces; (4) reforming the civilian judiciary, and (5) protecting human rights
defenders from attack. Curiously, speaking in the context of Colombia specifically, Assistant Secretary
Koh does not mention the war on drugs as Colombia's priority. In fact, he does not mention it at all.
See generallyRemarks of Hongju Koh, supra note 233.
235. Indeed, the U.S. Ambassador in Colombia, speaking in Washington, declared that drugs are
the problem in the issue of U.S. assistance. See Sergio G6mez Maseri, Las Expectivas las Gener6 E. U.:
Moreno, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Nov. 15, 1999 [hereinafter Las Expectivas]. Clearly, drugs are
the problem from the U.S. perspective. This is not to say that they are not a problem for Colombia, but
drugs are by no means the single nor the principal problem.
236. See Press Center Briefing, supra note 233. (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs,
Thomas Pickering stating, "But the focal point, the center pivot of American policy, the spear point of
American policy, is to work together with Colombia to deal with its narcotics trafficking. That will, I
think, inevitably affect some of the guerrilla organizations, but it is directed at the narcotics effort.").
237. U.S. Ambassador in Colombia, Curtis Kamman, has stated that the U.S.'s priority in Colombia
continues to be the drug problem, the "root of all evils" in the country. Las Expectivas, supra note 235.
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bound to questions of military strategy. And, funding is targeted to Colombia's
armed forces.
The arguments supporting this position are presented as a natural response to
the threat presented. They draw on the impact of international law ideas such as
sovereignty and national defense.23 s Ever increasing levels of drug production and
trade are characterized as loosening the Colombian state's grip on sovereignty.
Colombia's eroding sovereignty, the argument goes, risks being replaced by a
narco-state or narco-districts, directly challenging U.S. security interests.239 While
direct military action has been repeatedly rejected by U.S. officials,24 ° its logic still
permeates policy on the matter.24'
The connections between the drug war and the Cold War have already been
well demonstrated by international scholars. The blurring of the lines between
leftist insurgents and narco-guerrillas is rather complete. Quite clearly, the rhetoric
of a narco-state's threat to national security reinforces a Cold War approach to
Latin American relations. Upholding cooperating states, becomes the justification
for fortifying and influencing governments beholden to U.S. policy interests, with
little regard to the internal political situation. Ironically, this course is the least
mindful of Colombia's sovereignty.
The U.S. reaction over the de-militarized zone is particularly illustrative.242
Washington's initial position was not reassuring; in fact, it was outright hostile.
Legislators were more concerned about drug interdiction programs - despite their
dismal track record in Colombia- than about paving the way for a negotiated

238. See generally, Zackrison & Bradley, supra note 31 (arguing that the Colombian insurgency's
increasing links to the drug trade threaten the sovereignty of the Colombian state).
239. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 16. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs testified that, "Colombia's national sovereignty is now increasingly threatened
by well-armed and ruthless guerrillas, by paramilitaries and by the narcotrafficking interests which are
directly interlinked in many ways .... Although the Government is not directly at risk, these threats
are slowly eroding the authority of the central government and depriving it of the ability to govern
outlying areas.....As a result, large swaths of Colombia are in danger of being narco-districts ......
(emphasis added).
240. See 'A MilitarySolution is not possible' Clinton, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), July 22, 1999
(reporting on President Clinton's letter to President Pastrana which emphasizes the U.S. leader's
rejection of military means to solve the Colombian crisis); see also, Press Center Briefing supra note
233 (In response to a question about multilateral intervention in Colombia, Undersecretary of State
Thomas Pickering responded, "Well, I would first like to use this opportunity for the hundredth time to
deny as crazy, loco, whatever words you want to use, this particular concept, which seems to have a life
of its own.").
241.
See Douglas Farah, US. Ready to Boost Aid to Troubled Colombia, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
1999, at AOl [hereinafter Farah] (reporting on the U.S. position articulated by Drug Czar General Barry
McCaffery and Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering: "[Pastrana] ...risks losing U.S. support if
he makes further concession to the insurgents ....[Tihe U. S. will sharply increase aid if [Pastrana]
develops a comprehensive plan to strengthen the military ....).
242. See Ana Carrigan, Colombia differs with US. on Narco-War Tactics, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
20, 1998, at 5 [hereinafter Carrigan], ("In the view of Congress, Pastrana's bold new policies are at best
unwelcome, at worst downright dangerous. Congress has only two things in mind when it focuses on
Colombia: drugs, and narco-guerrillas.").
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peace.24 U.S. authorities opposed the withdrawal of Colombian armed forces from
the area because of its potential impact on drug trafficking and cultivation.2"
Acceding to this long-standing FARC demand revealed a bold move on the part of
Pastrana. Still, in the U.S., it was greeted with widespread suspicion.245 Not'
because of a disagreement over strategy or the impact on local populations, instead,
it was opposed because of potential effect on the drug war. While the U.S. position
changed after some intense shuttle diplomacy by Colombian officials, the priority of
concerns was clear. To the extent U.S. drug policy becomes the exclusive
framework,246 international-based assistance would not advance the cause of peace.
Alternatively, on the left of the spectrum are calls to deny U.S. assistance
altogether. These arguments draw mostly on the reported links between the
Colombian military and outlaw paramilitary groups. 47 The Colombian military has
been widely condemned as a major violator of international human rights. Indeed,
the U.S. government suspended military assistance to the Colombians precisely on
these grounds. 4 ' Reports troublingly continue to link the Colombian military to
right-wing terrorism.249 As the main violator of human rights in the country,
paramilitaries are perceived as a particularly heinous protagonist.250 The military's
complicity, by commission or omission, threatens to exacerbate the abuses.
Furthermore, proponents of this position caution against supporting the wrong ally.
In the face of Colombia's dizzyingly complex internal war, human rights advocates
present localization of the conflict as a preferable course. Clearly, this argument
could easily extend beyond current proposals and include a curtailment of existing
aid or even an embargo on arms or other assistance.
243.

See also, De Colombia no se habla en E.U, EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Aug. 20, 1999

(citing foreign relations expert Prof. Abraham F. Lowenthal's assertion that the U.S. Congress's single
concern in Colombia is drug-trafficking and not the internal war).

244.

See Carrigan, supra note, 242 at 5. ("Odds are that Pastrana's commitment to honor his

overwhelming mandate from the electorate to negotiate will again collide with the only Colombian

policy in town: U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey's counter-narcotics war.").
245. Id. Citing a State Department source: "This peace process has frightened the heck out of
people here."
246. See MAX HILLAIRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION

IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (1997) (tracing the body of international law advanced by U.S.
authorities in defense of military intervention in Latin America. Interestingly, based on past U.S.

international legal practices, armed intervention in Colombia today can be amply justified in legal terms
even if it is not a political or practical objective). See also Press Center Briefing, supra note 233.
247.

Despite the widely reported connections by human rights groups and others, the current U.S.

Ambassador in BogotA has asserted that these links are not demonstrable. Cited in Sergio G6mez
Maseri, E.U condicionaayudaparasusituci6n, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti, Colom.), Nov. 2, 1999.

248. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Peter Romero, has stated
that there has been significant improvement on this front and a couple of general officers and a couple
of colonels have been arrested because of their links to paramilitaries. See On-the-Record Briefing of
the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1999 [hereinafter State Dept. Briefing] available at
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefmgs/9908/990823db.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2000).
249. Amidst U.S.'s consideration of a U.S.$ 1 billion military aid proposal, the Colombian armed

forces are embroiled in controversy over rumblings of a dirty war. To mention one internationallyknown case, the assassination of political satirist and representative of civil society in the ELN peace
process, Jaime Garz6n, focused the point. National grief over the beloved figure's death turned to anger

when reports filtered that the military was a likely suspect. See id.
250.

See generally Remarks of Hongju Koh, supra note 233.
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However, this type of argument is based on several faulty presuppositions.
Proponents presume that concerted or even bi-lateral disengagement is less
compromising than a program of structured assistance. These arguments draw on
apprehensions about further involvement in a foreign conflict. They also draw on
ambivalence about taking sides in a murky war. However, the call for isolationism
or non-intervention is not value free in Colombia. On the contrary, it has its own
set of backers. Indeed, this position has quite significant supporters within
Colombian politics. And, it is not simply the leftist insurgents and narcotraffickers
who stand to benefit. Although, of course, they will. More broadly, this position
aligns with those in favor of a confrontational solution. Torpedoing international
involvement has the effect of hastening the failure of proposed negotiations. Indeed,
narrowing the possibility for an internationally-based initiative helps clear the way
for the likely alternative of continued hostilities.
As a result, this position is not tenable as a mode of tempering the internal war.
Quite the contrary, it has much in common with orthodox internationalism. While
outwardly presented as an international prescription for peace, it in fact excludes
more ambitious proposals that could support the peace process. Human rights
organizations and others that vehemently oppose assistance also foreclose the gains
that international engagement may bring. In this same manner, Colombian
publicists profess to champion internationalist proposals while actually limiting the
range of internationalist creativity. Moreover, eschewing financial support for
Pastrana's program threatens to undermine the institutional representatives of
peace in Colombia. Undeniably, the military's human rights record makes this less
than an optimal choice. And this is by no means a defense of military wrongdoing.
However, any quick survey of the Colombian situation demonstrates there is no
unproblematic alternative and no untroubling ally.
Finally, there is support for yet a third alternative. This scheme attempts to
reconcile the previously mentioned concerns and addresses the conflict more
globally. Specifically, the proposal is for military assistance coupled with social
and economic aid which is subject to a number of conditions. This third alternative
actually describes all of the major assistance proposals currently on the table. From
Pastrana's Plan Colombia to legislation introduced by Senators Coverdale and
DeWine to the Clinton administration's proposal, all fall within the type of
assistance package described here. All three proposals pay heed to the political and
economic dimensions of the Colombian conflict. They also acknowledge the need
to extend the military's accountability for human rights abuses whether directly or
through paramilitaries.
However, they differ sharply in terms of their proportions of military versus
social assistance. They also differ in terms of the range of conditions to be
imposed. Indeed, Congressional consideration may further add to the list of
possible requirements. These decisions will have a vast impact on the course of the
peace process. As such, they are crucial questions which will be decided as this
Article is being published. Still, the questions raised in this section are applicable
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across a number of international contexts. Furthermore, they will continue to be
key in terms of developing policy on Colombia.
B. Drug War Conditions versus Conditionsfor Peace
In Washington circles, some of the potential conditions that have surfaced
include: limiting military aid to counternarcotics as opposed to counter-insurgency
actions; recovery by the Colombian state of territorial control over the demilitarized
zone, non-interference with current extradition laws relating to Colombian
nationals, strengthening of the military forces, professionalization of the military
justice system. While these policy conditions no doubt have advocates inside
Colombia, they decisively impact on controversial questions as to the handling of
the internal war.
Imposing conditions on aid, while clearly a valuable tool, risks some
unexpected alliances with actors in Colombia. Specifically, certain conditions
threaten to escalate the internal war rather than to assist peace. Certain currently
proposed conditions threaten to redefine Colombia's political conflict solely in
terms of a drug war, reducing the potential for an effective reconciliation and
narrowing the range of international responses.
Furthermore, conditions limiting military assistance to counternarcotics as
opposed to counterinsurgency are disingenuous. For in fact, the impetus for
increased aid is based on the very indistinguishability of leftist guerrillas and narcotraffickers, the so-called narco-guerrilla.2"' The guerrillas's deep involvement in the
drug trade, it is asserted, makes it impossible to defeat one without the other.
Differentiating them through the backdoor of conditionality corresponds, rather
fantastically, to a domestic political contortion. 2 Indeed, it attempts to mollify the
opponents of U.S. aid by adopting a course of military counter-insurgency while
pretending to avoid such an intervention.
The impact of this stance is to escalate Colombia's domestic political violence
to an international drug war. Indeed, conditions of this type have the effect of
251. Since Cesar (aviria's administration, left wing guerrillas have been linked with the drug trade.
This association has been emphasized in the government's public relations campaign against the
insurgents. The link has also been emphasized by U.S. leaders in an effort to secure more assistance for
the Colombian military under the rubric of counter-narcotics. Indeed, the link has been so strongly
drawn that it has become the basis for assertions about Colombia's threat to regional stability. These
assertions are frequently accompaniedfby rumors of U.S. military intervention, regional intervention, or
third-country recognition of guerrilla groups. See Tim Padgett & Cathleen Farrell, A Shift in the
Balance ofPower; In a Risky Bid for Peace, Colombia's Government Cedes Political Control in Parts
of the Country to Marxist Guerrillas. Will it Work? TIME, Sept. 28, 1998, at 14.
252. See Press Center Briefing, supra note 233. In response to a journalist's question pointing out
the contradiction in asserting the interrelatedness of Colombia's problems while emphasizing the threat
singularly as narcotics, Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering responded: "Unfortunately, there is
enough of an area of narcotics development in both production and trafficking to absorb a lot of
Colombian effort and a lot of American assistance.... But the focal point, the center pivot of American
policy, the spear point of American policy, is to work together with Colombia to deal with its narcotics
trafficking. That will, I think, inevitably affect some of the guerrilla organizations, but it is directed at
the narcotics effort." Id.
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repackaging Colombia's civil strife for the worse. The political dimension of the
conflict is bracketed out. In turn, in order to obtain support, Colombian officials
are forced to sustain the rhetoric of a pervasive narco-war.
This framework has grave consequences for the fledgling peace process.
Indeed, it has already forced the Pastrana government into compromising positions.
Walking a thin line between justifying aid and not endangering peace talks, the
president has had a difficult job. In public and international fora, he has had to
assert that the guerrillas both are drug-traffickers and are not purely criminals - the
former justifies aid, the latter justifies negotiating with them." 3 While the actual
situation is difficult to quantify, most agree that the guerrillas at a minimum provide
protection for drug-related activities. In any case, the position has won him the
enmity of the political right and doubts from others. Faced with the breakdown of
peace talks, Pastrana is forced to defend the guerrillas, thereby compromising his
own political position. All this, it seems, in an effort to proceed with the peace
process and to sustain his leadership. The U.S. State Department has continued to
2
concentrate on the guerrilla's drug link despite Pastrana's statements. 5
Whatever the reality, the framework of a drug war undermines the Colombian
government's range of autonomy. Faced with U.S. conditions, the internal political
situation is eclipsed. 255 As a drug issue, it also narrows the range of alternatives and
international arrangements which might be brought to bear on the conflict. Indeed,
it places U.S. drug policy over and above the objective of peace. In terms of its
impact inside Colombia, this course runs counter to securing negotiations. Notably,
the type of conditions that are set may end up mandating U.S. drug policy as a
condition for assistance.
Another type of condition on aid being contemplated relates to the
demilitarized zone and military activities directly. This type of condition is less tied
to the type of war, either counter-insurgency or counter-narcotics, that is being
waged. Instead, it directs the mode in which the conflict should be conducted. In
this connection, conditions over the demilitarized zone as well as requirements for a
strengthening of the military point toward an escalation of the war. Clearly, these

253. President Pastrana declared to the Argentine press: "No evidence exists that the FARC are
drug-traffickers. Yes, they charge fees to the narcos. But the FARC have always said that they are
interested in the eradication of illicit crops. It is also said that the demilitarized zone is flooded with
drug-trafficking and that is also not true." Following these comments, he insisted: "While I am
president of Colombia there will be no foreign intervention." EL CLARN (Buenos Aires, Arg.). July 29,
1999.
254. Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Peter Romero: "I think that it
would be naive to think that they [the FARC] are not involved in production; we believe that they are
involved, in some cases, in production. But by and large they reap profits from trafficking, whether
they're involved in cultivation or actually trafficking into the United States. They are deeply involved in
the whole enterprise." See State Dept. Briefing supra note 248.
255. The different but related rationale for the ouster of General Manuel Noriega in Panama surely
raises concern. No matter how unlikely in the eyes of U.S. policymakers today, facing the pointedness
of a justification for intervention that a narco-war might entail, Pastrana is particularly in a difficult
diplomatic position.
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conditions spring from similar criminal enforcement perspectives. By delimiting
the strategy, the U.S. may indirectly pull the strings of the peace process. 56
In significant part, U.S. policy is already aimed at strengthening the Colombian

military."'

No doubt this is a sensible fall-back position for the Colombian

government, however it is problematic as the central piece of the United States'
Colombia policy. To the extent that the United States sets this agenda for the
Colombian peace process,25 military expansion will become a background fact.
Political and financial responsibility for its implementation would no longer lie with
Colombian leaders but would instead become part of the peace package.
Peace assistance that has the drug war as its central feature risks defeating the
ultimate goal. Despite other social assistance, U.S. concerns are primarily framed
in terms of propping up Colombia's diminished sovereignty and military control in
order to make counter-narcotics more effective. While Clinton administration
officials have lauded the peace initiative, significant pressure has been directed to
Colombia' government to re-establish sovereign control over its territory. Indeed,
military expansion is a centerpiece of the Clinton administration's
recommendations. Even objections to military assistance because of human rights
abuses have given way. Military control has taken precedence over peace
negotiations, human rights or foreign assistance.259 While this, of course, reflects
U.S. interests, holding the Colombian government to this standard of sovereignty whether overtly characterized as such or more subtly implied - ignores the
political as well as the military situation in that country. Not so different from
256. Indeed some of the parameters for a peace agreement advanced by Undersecretary of State
Thomas Pickering go farther than public statements made by President Pastrana: "[I]f the guerrillas
would accept to participate in an open democracy in an open and democratic way, as has happened with
other insurgencies in the hemisphere, then he [Pastrana] would work to find the space to permit that to
happen." Press Center Briefing, supra note 232.
257. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, speaking in Cartagena last year, made his position clear
regarding the need the strengthen the Colombian military to combat narco-terrorism. See U.S. pushes
Colombia to build stronger military, REuTERS, Nov. 30, 1998. This news item reports that "U.S.
military commanders admit the line between anti-drug and counter insurgency operations has become
blurred." Id.
258. The preeminence of U.S. interests in the process was reported by the Washington Post. In
separate visits to Colombia, senior U.S. officials warned President Andrds Pastrana that he risks losing
U.S. support if he makes further concessions to the insurgents in an effort to restrart stalled peace
negotiations, according to sources familiar with the talks. But the officials, White House drug policy
director Barry R. McCaffrey and Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, also told Pastrana the
United States will sharply increase aid if he develops a comprehensive plan to strengthen the military,
halt the nation's economic free fall and fight drug trafficking. Farah, supra note 241, AOl. In response
to the Washington Post article, the U.S. State Department commented: "Well, the idea that we're going
to try to micro-manage the Colombian Government's counter-insurgency strategy is wrong." U.S.
Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Aug. 23, 1999.
259. See U.S. CounternarcoticsEfforts with the Government of Colombia: Hearing Before the
Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrerism Subcomm. Of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (Mar. 24, 1999) (testimony of Rand Beers, Assistant Sec'y Int'l
Narcotics and Law Enforcement) [hereinafter Beers Testimony]. "We have made it clear to the
Government of Colombia that we will not support alternative development in areas of the country that
are not under Colombian government control - which is the case for most of the coca cultivation areas.
Our initial support will be confined to projects in the opium poppy cultivation region until such time at
the Government of Colombia can assure adequate control of the coca production region."
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Colombian publicists, reinforcing the state by insisting on its formal functions is
counterproductive. It places all hopes with a set of "sovereign" institutions
incapable of fulfilling the agenda set by conservatives in Colombia or the U.S.
government. Instead, conditions must be tailored to allow for a renegotiation of the
Colombian state which would then provide the backdrop for sovereign
accountability.
U.S. interests will be better served in this instance by not rushing to set the
agenda.2" Siding effectively with conservative publicists, while appearing to
befriend the Pastrana administration,26' will neither defeat the guerrillas nor will it
secure peace.262 On the contrary, it may further choke the Colombian government
and reintensify the long-running guerrilla conflict, making the drug trade more
difficult to combat in the end.
Rather than mandate military expansion, the U.S. should stand for the widening
of democratic rights. Considering the diagnosis of highly limited political
participation in Colombia, this may be a more effective requirement upon which to
condition aid. In addition, aid can be tied to progress on negotiations, preliminary
accords reached by the parties, and even transparency in the use of funds. In short,
the U.S. could help propel Colombia over some of the stumbling blocks of its
current political system.
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK
Colombia's internal violence is deeply-rooted in its history of exclusionary
politics, and it is not a marginal phenomenon. A solution that is, itself, exclusionary
and repressive will only aggravate this dynamic. A framework that would give
priority to the drug war is also not likely to foster political development. On the
contrary, constraints of this nature merely reproduce the exclusive and hierarchical
political structure already in place in Colombia. Moreover, if such arrangements
are presented as conditions for assistance or as dictated by international
requirement, they undermine a legal regime open to political participation and
debate over national priorities.
Both the orthodox publicist and the rhetoric of the drug-war conditionality
attempt to stand above contrary viewpoints. Indeed, both present themselves as
impervious to alternative proposals: even when alternative proposals may be more
in line with ending the guerrilla war and reducing the flow of drugs.
260. This recommendation coincides with the remarks of Michael Shifter of the Inter-American
Dialogue. See Shifter, supra note 27 ("The United States has an opportunity to establish greater
cooperation on a variety of fronts with a very important country in this hemisphere. This does not mean
setting down firm conditions for a peace agreement as the outset of the process, hut rather stepping back
and allowing the new Colombian government to shape what it deems acceptable terms.").
261. See Press Release, James Rubin, U.S. Department of State (Sept. 23, 1999) (on file with
author), praising President Pastrana's integrated approach. U.S. Department of State, Press Releases,
Sept. 23, 1999.
262. See Beers Testimony, supra note 259, at 2. ("This Administration has also made the point
that the Colombian effort cannot exclude counternarcotics operations in the demilitarized zone created
by the peace process"). Id.
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Orthodox internationalism clearly works a disservice to the cause of peace. The
landscape of doctrines it advances blunts the potential benefits of international
proposals. In the place of incentives to peace, orthodox thinking fuels further war.
Instead of international accountability, it stands as a defense of the state.
International doctrines are used to stifle the possibility for political reform. This
result is achieved by defining reform as beyond the power of the state. International
law, in this context, furnishes the limits, narrow limits that make the state virtually
non-negotiable.
The point here is not to argue against any limits on political compromise.
Rather, the objective is to consider how those limits are drawn. Ones that are too
narrowly defined may either break or not offer enough room for negotiation.
Orthodox internationalism is clearly in this category. The fear is that a loosening of
the legal rules will result in the demise of limits and accountability. As such, law
would no longer provide constraints against extremist or non-democratic demands.
Even a demand like the elimination of popular elections and majority rule may need
to be taken seriously if not restricted by a higher law. In light of the guerrilla
challenge to state institutionality; national norms would clearly be of no
consequence in this connection.
Orthodox interpretations of international law, however, turn out to be rather
counter-productive as a source of limits. In its place, contemporary international
practice presents some alternatives, providing less of a focus on sovereignty and
belligerency constraints in favor of broader authority for rights-based guarantees
for individuals. These guarantees, however, do not extend to preserving the
existing Colombian state as is. In the context of political reconfiguration, the most
salient international obligations would involve human rights and, increasingly,
democratic rights. Although possibly not endorsed by all sectors of society, this
agenda is already a priority for both of Colombia's national parties. As such, the
growing body of pronouncements on human rights, democratic government, and
international crimes offers a legally- bounded framework in which international law
may serve effectively as the language of the peace talks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its current limitations, there is a role for international law to play in
Colombia's peace process. Clearly, orthodox versions of internationalism merely
have the state as its project, and thus act to hinder rather than lead the peace talks.
Additionally, U.S.-driven proposals harbor the pitfalls addressed above. While they
do offer a legal framework, they threaten to marginalize the primacy of the political
conflict. Nonetheless, a shift in legal discourse has the ability to produce some
needed movement. That is, a switch in the established and normalized rhetoric of
power has the potential, if only in the short term, of providing some room for
negotiation.
Considering the monopoly of orthodox internationalism, a turn to more
modem precedents or creative innovation may unsettle some of the long entrenched
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positions. Additionally, securing multi-lateral participation and assistance would
provide a beneficial counter-balance to the single-mindedness of U.S. policy.
Injecting some alternatives to discussions on prisoner exchanges or humanitarian
agreements may strengthen the process. In this regard, Colombian internationalists
need not despair. The current international consensus is by no means devoid of
limits. Thus, it is not the case that impunity will be condoned or democracy will be
abandoned. That would hardly be the case in light of the general movement to
global accountability in the form of an international criminal court, for example.
Moreover, it is not the case that human rights demands or democratic mechanisms
will be tossed aside. If anything, these principles will be more uniformly required
by the world community.
Opening up debate on international norms, however, is not sufficient in the
long run. Broadly participatory national politics will require a more accessible and
responsive conception of law. If the Colombian experience teaches anything, it is
that the law itself can be a source of disorder.

